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ABSTRACT
This Article reveals a new resistance strategy to disability 
rights in the workplace. The initial backlash against the Americans 
with Disabilities Act of 1990 (ADA) targeted protected class status 
by characterizing the ADA’s accommodation mandate as special
treatment that benefitted the disabled at the expense of the 
nondisabled workforce. As a result, federal courts treated the ADA 
as a welfare statute rather than a civil rights law, which resulted in 
the Supreme Court dramatically narrowing the definition of 
disability. Congress responded with sweeping amendments in 2008 
to expand the class of individuals with disabilities who are entitled to 
accommodations and to align the ADA with Title VII of the Civil 
Rights Act of 1964 by establishing nearly universal impairment-
based antidiscrimination protection. While these amendments have 
largely dismantled the disability status barrier, employers and their 
attorneys are working to erect a new barrier with the ADA’s 
“otherwise qualified” provision, which requires plaintiffs to prove 
the ability to perform all of the “essential functions of the job” as 
part of a prima facie disability discrimination case. This Article 
shows how federal courts are using the concept of “essential job 
functions” to entrench able-bodied norms into seemingly neutral job 
descriptions and workplace designs to again restrict access to 
accommodations and undermine the ADA as a universal civil rights 
law. By replacing “non-disabled” with “non-qualified” as the 
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ADA’s new gatekeeper, this strategy effectively shifts disability 
stereotypes away from individuals with disabilities and onto the 
definition of work itself, which may render those stereotypes even 
more difficult to recognize and disrupt. 
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The unrealized potential of the original Americans with 
Disabilities Act of 1990 (ADA)1 is a well-documented story. Not 
long after disability rights advocates and lawmakers heralded the 
ADA as a “comprehensive national mandate” to eliminate disability 
discrimination in the workplace,2 the business community launched 
an effective narrative in both the popular press and in federal courts 
to undercut the statute’s impact as a core piece of civil rights 
                                                     
1. Pub. L. No. 101-336, 104 Stat. 327 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. 
§§ 12101-12117 (2012)). 
2. See 42 U.S.C. § 12101(b)(1).  
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legislation.3 By characterizing the ADA’s accommodation mandate 
as a form of special treatment, and by describing individuals with 
disabilities as unworthy recipients who were benefiting at the 
expense of the nondisabled workforce, employers convinced the 
federal judiciary to view the ADA as a costly welfare statute rather 
than a civil rights law.4 As a result, judges focused not on enforcing 
antidiscrimination protection, but on strictly policing the boundaries 
of the statute’s protected class.5 This persuasive campaign 
culminated in a series of United States Supreme Court cases that 
greatly restricted the ADA’s reach by narrowly defining who 
constitutes an individual with a disability.6
Congress responded to those decisions by enacting the ADA 
Amendments Act of 2008 (ADAAA),7 which opened the door for a 
disability rights revival. The ADAAA’s explicit purpose was to 
restore the class of individuals with disabilities to the broad scope 
that Congress had intended under the original ADA.8 The ADAAA’s 
implicit objective, however, was to recast the ADA as a civil rights 
statute on par with Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. 
Congress accomplished this larger objective by extricating disability 
from the broader concept of impairment and placing impairment 
alongside race, religion, national origin, sex, and age as an additional 
protected class under federal antidiscrimination law.9 Yet this major 
                                                     
3. See generally BACKLASH AGAINST THE ADA: REINTERPRETING 
DISABILITY RIGHTS (Linda Hamilton Krieger ed., 2003) (compiling articles on the 
social and judicial backlash against the original ADA). 
4. See Michelle A. Travis, Lashing Back at the ADA Backlash: How the 
Americans with Disabilities Act Benefits Americans Without Disabilities, 76 TENN.
L. REV. 311, 315-20 (2009) (summarizing evidence of this narrative).  
5. Id. at 318.  
6. See Chai R. Feldblum, Definition of Disability Under Federal Anti-
Discrimination Law: What Happened? Why? And What Can We Do About It?, 21 
BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 91, 139-60 (2000) (detailing the Supreme Court’s 
narrowing of the ADA’s disability definition during the 1990s). 
7. Pub. L. No. 110-325, 122 Stat. 3553 [hereinafter ADAAA] (codified at 
42 U.S.C. §§ 12101-12113). The ADAAA took effect on January 1, 2009. See id.
§ 8.
8. See id. § 2; see also Cheryl L. Anderson, Ideological Dissonance, 
Disability Backlash, and the ADA Amendments Act, 55 WAYNE L. REV. 1267, 1270 
(2009); Chai R. Feldblum, Kevin Barry & Emily A. Benfer, The ADA Amendments 
Act of 2008, 13 TEX. J. ON C.L. & C.R. 187 (2008); Ani B. Satz, Disability 
Discrimination After the ADA Amendments Act of 2008: Foreword, 2010 UTAH L.
REV. 983, 985. 
9. See generally Michelle A. Travis, Impairment as Protected Status: A 
New Universality for Disability Rights, 46 GA. L. REV. 937 (2012) [hereinafter 
Travis, Impairment].
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accomplishment garnered little attention as advocates wisely framed 
the amendments as only addressing the definition of disability and as 
merely restoring that definition to what was intended under the 
original ADA.10
Understanding the ADAAA’s real contribution to the civil 
rights landscape requires an understanding of the various roles 
played by the statute’s three-pronged definition of disability and how 
those roles changed before and after the amendments. Under the 
original ADA, all of the prongs potentially served the same two 
purposes: both defining the class of individuals who are protected 
from employment discrimination and determining who may be 
eligible for reasonable workplace accommodations. The three-
pronged definition included: (1) individuals with “a physical or 
mental impairment that substantially limits one or more major life 
activities” (the “actual” disability prong); (2) individuals with “a 
record of such an impairment” (the “record of” prong); and (3) 
individuals who are “regarded as having such an impairment” (the 
“regarded as” prong).11 Employees rarely invoked the “record of” 
prong, so nearly all pre-ADAAA case law involved “actual” and 
“regarded as” claims. 
Because courts were focused on limiting the impact of the 
ADA’s accommodation mandate—and because it was unclear 
whether that mandate applied to all parts of the disability 
definition12—courts scrutinized all of the categories and restricted 
their scope under the original statute in dramatic ways. Courts 
narrowed the “actual” disability category by assessing the effects of 
impairments with the use of mitigating measures such as medication, 
setting a high hurdle for the “substantially limits” requirement, and 
deeming “major life activities” to only include functions that are 
central to most people’s daily lives.13 Courts virtually eliminated 
“regarded as” claims by requiring an employee to prove that an 
employer mistakenly regarded him or her as meeting the narrow 
                                                     
10. See id. at 940. 
11. 42 U.S.C. § 12102(1). 
12. See Michelle A. Travis, Leveling the Playing Field or Stacking the 
Deck? The “Unfair Advantage” Critique of Perceived Disability Claims, 78 N.C. L.
REV. 901, 920-27 (2000) [hereinafter Travis, Leveling] (documenting the Circuit 
Court split); see also Michael D. Moberly, Letting Katz Out of the Bag: The 
Employer’s Duty to Accommodate Perceived Disabilities, 30 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 603, 
610-33 (1998) (same). 
13. See Feldblum, supra note 6, at 139-57. 
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judicial definition of an actual disability.14 In so doing, courts 
effectively grafted a functional limitations test onto the “regarded as” 
prong, and many courts further required proof that the employer’s 
misperceptions resulted from disability-based animus or 
stereotypes.15 By the time Congress responded with the ADAAA in 
2008, case law had blurred together the “actual” and “regarded as” 
categories and had limited the statute’s reach to a very small 
minority group.16
The ADAAA made major changes to both the “actual” and 
“regarded as” prongs, which is how Congress accomplished both its 
explicit and its implicit goals. The ADAAA has received the most 
attention for expanding the “actual” disability category by requiring 
courts to assess impairments without reference to mitigating 
measures,17 by lowering the “substantial limitations” hurdle,18 by 
expanding the list of “major life activities,”19 and by demanding that 
courts interpret the protected class as broadly as possible.20 Yet in 
many ways, Congress’s greatest accomplishment was in the 
ADAAA’s amendments to the “regarded as” prong. It was through 
the “regarded as” amendments that Congress established nearly 
universal impairment-based antidiscrimination protection, thereby 
solidifying the ADA’s status alongside Title VII as a core civil rights 
law.  
Congress accomplished this result in two steps. First, the 
ADAAA severed the accommodation mandate from claims brought 
under the “regarded as” prong.21 Second, the ADAAA provided that 
a “regarded as” plaintiff need only prove that an employer took an 
adverse employment action because of the plaintiff’s real or 
perceived impairment—not that the employer also regarded the 
                                                     
14. See id. at 157-60; see also Travis, Impairment, supra note 9, at 946-49.
15. See Travis, Impairment, supra note 9, at 947-49. 
16. Id. at 947. 
17. See ADAAA, supra note 7, §§ 2(b)(2), 4(a) (codified at 42 U.S.C. 
§ 12102(4)(E)(i)). The ADAAA also expanded the “actual” disability prong by 
clarifying that “[a]n impairment that is episodic or in remission is a disability if it 
would substantially limit a major life activity when active.” See id. § 4(a) (codified 
at 42 U.S.C. § 12102(4)(D)). 
18. See id. § 2(a)(7)-(8), (b)(4)-(5) (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 12101 note); see 
also id. § 4(a) (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 12102(4)(B)). 
19. See id. § 4(a) (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 12102(2)) (expanding the list of 
“major life activities” and including major bodily functions); see also id. § 2(b)(4) 
(codified at 42 U.S.C. § 12102 note). 
20. See id. § 4(a) (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 12102(4)). 
21. See id. § 6(a)(1) (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 12201(h)). 
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impairment as substantially limiting a major life activity, nor that the 
employer’s decision resulted from disability-based prejudice or 
stereotypes.22 Without a functional limitations component or a 
stigma-based inquiry, the “regarded as” prong now protects nearly 
all individuals from impairment-based decision-making in the 
workplace, just as Title VII protects against employment decisions 
based on race, color, national origin, religion, and sex.23 By applying 
the accommodation mandate only to individuals whose impairments 
are or have been substantially limiting, and by expanding simple 
antidiscrimination protection to cover individuals with nearly all 
physical or mental impairments, the ADAAA extricated disability 
from the broader concept of impairment and bestowed upon 
impairment the status of an independent protected class.24 In other 
words, the amended ADA now prohibits discrimination on the basis 
of impairment, while using disability as the trigger for 
accommodation rights.  
Through these amendments, Congress did more than just reject 
federal courts’ narrow interpretation of disability status, which is 
often described as the ADAAA’s sole contribution. The amendments 
also reflect congressional rejection of federal courts’ treatment of the 
ADA as a welfare statute for a minority group whose members must 
demonstrate their worthiness to receive the statute’s benefits. By 
providing nearly universal impairment-based antidiscrimination 
protection, Congress firmly established the amended ADA alongside 
Title VII as a core piece of civil rights legislation.  
Because of the original ADA’s history of backlash and 
resistance, scholars received the amendments with guarded 
optimism. Despite explicit congressional repudiation of Supreme 
Court decisions and well-crafted language to support broad access to 
disability-based accommodations and impairment-based 
antidiscrimination protection, scholars wondered whether employers 
and courts would continue to resist the ADAAA’s full import as a 
civil rights law. Although the ADAAA largely eliminated courts’ 
ability to use disability status as the law’s gatekeeper, the 
                                                     
22. See id. § 3 (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 12102(3)); see also Travis, 
Impairment, supra note 9, at 950-51.
23. See Travis, Impairment, supra note 9, at 951-55. Protection from 
impairment-based discrimination is “nearly” universal because Congress carved out 
a narrow exclusion for impairments that are both transitory and minor. See ADAAA, 
supra note 7, § 3 (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 12102(3)(B)). “Transitory” is defined as 
having “an actual or expected duration of 6 months or less.” Id.
24. See Travis, Impairment, supra note 9, at 951-55. 
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amendments did not eliminate the incentives on employers and 
courts to find another gate-keeping mechanism to avoid the difficult 
questions of accommodation and full recognition of disability civil 
rights.25 So while disability rights advocates rightfully applauded 
Congress’s bold restoration of the ADA’s protected class, scholars 
worried that a lurking Hydra head might soon emerge.26 In Greek 
mythology, the Hydra was an infamous, multi-headed creature that 
was nearly impossible to slay because every time a would-be 
vanquisher severed one of the creature’s heads, another head grew in 
its place.27 While commentators awaited new case law during the 
delay period caused by the ADAAA’s nonretroactivity, they 
speculated about the risk that a new head might replace the one 
severed by Congress’s rejection of courts’ narrow interpretations of 
disability status.28
Although scholars identified several potential sources for a new 
Hydra head,29 the most common concern was that the ADA’s 
                                                     
25. See Hillary K. Valderrama, Comment, Is the ADAAA a “Quick Fix” or 
Are We Out of the Frying Pan and into the Fire?: How Requiring Parties to 
Participate in the Interactive Process Can Effect Congressional Intent Under the 
ADAAA, 47 HOUS. L. REV. 175, 202-03 (2010) (describing the “definition of 
disability” as the pre-ADAAA “gatekeeper,” and arguing that “courts have similar 
incentives to establish another gatekeeping mechanism”); Nicole Buonocore Porter, 
The New ADA Backlash, 82 TENN. L. REV. 1, 4-5 (2014) [hereinafter Porter, 
Backlash] (positing that “[b]ecause courts and employers see the ADA as giving 
preferential treatment to individuals with disabilities . . . [and] because courts can no 
longer limit ADA protection using the definition of disability, [courts] might feel 
compelled to limit protection in other ways”).
26. The Hydra image is borrowed from Professor Deborah A. Widiss, who 
used it to describe courts’ tendency to continue applying a congressionally 
overridden statutory interpretation precedent to similar language in other statutes. 
See Deborah A. Widiss, Undermining Congressional Overrides: The Hydra 
Problem in Statutory Interpretation, 90 TEX. L. REV. 859, 863, 866, 877 (2012). In 
the ADA context, the Hydra problem is intra- rather than inter-statutory in nature. 
27. See id. at 877. 
28. See, e.g., Michael Ashley Stein et al., Accommodating Every Body, 81 
U. CHI. L. REV. 689, 722 (2014) (“If the primary result of plaintiffs [overcoming] . . . 
the question of disability is only that they lose on summary judgment on the other 
elements of the prima facie case, little will have been gained by the ADAAA . . . .”).
29. One potential Hydra head is the ADA’s “impairment” definition, which 
was largely ignored in pre-ADAAA case law. See Travis, Impairment, supra note 9,
at 959-81 (analyzing the risk that courts might use “impairment” to limit protection 
under the ADAAA); see also SAMUEL R. BAGENSTOS, LAW AND THE 
CONTRADICTIONS OF THE DISABILITY RIGHTS MOVEMENT 51-52 (2009) (suggesting 
that pre-ADAAA case law “gives judges tools to read ‘impairment’ parsimoniously” 
in post-ADAAA cases); Elizabeth F. Emens, Disabling Attitudes: U.S. Disability 
Law and the ADA Amendments Act, 60 AM. J. COMP. L. 205, 209, 213 (2012) (noting 
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“qualified individual” requirement might become the new gatekeeper 
for statutory protection.30 Although the ADAAA expanded the 
protected class of individuals with disabilities, Congress did not 
change the wording in the ADA’s antidiscrimination provision, 
which has always extended protection not to all individuals with 
disabilities, but only to individuals with disabilities who are 
“qualified.”31 Nor did Congress change the statute’s definition of a 
                                                                                                               
that courts might “put more pressure on the evidence required to demonstrate an 
‘impairment’” as a “new way[ ] to narrow the ADA’s protections”). But see Nicole 
Buonocore Porter, Essay, Relieving (Most of) the Tension: A Review Essay of 
Samuel R. Bagenstos, Law and the Contradictions of the Disability Rights 
Movement, 20 CORNELL J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 761, 776 (2011) (expressing a “positive 
outlook” that courts will not “turn to interpreting ‘impairment’ strictly to limit 
coverage”). Another potential Hydra head is the ADA’s causation element, which 
requires plaintiffs to prove “that any adverse action was taken on the basis of 
disability.” See Stein et al., supra note 28, at 723-26 (analyzing case law indicating 
that causation might replace disability status as a new ADA gatekeeper). 
30. See, e.g., Stephen F. Befort, Let’s Try This Again: The ADA 
Amendments Act of 2008 Attempts To Reinvigorate the “Regarded As” Prong of the 
Statutory Definition of Disability, 2010 UTAH L. REV. 993, 1022 (predicting that 
ADAAA cases “will center more on whether an individual is qualified”); Emens, 
supra note 29, at 213-14 (predicting that the ADAAA will “put pressure on courts to
decide who is ‘otherwise qualified,’” and that “courts inclined to keep the scope of 
the statute limited may interpret [that] provision[] restrictively”); Sharona Hoffman, 
The Importance of Immutability in Employment Discrimination Law, 52 WM. &
MARY L. REV. 1483, 1499 (2011) (warning that the ADAAA may not increase 
plaintiffs’ success rate because “a court may determine that a plaintiff was not 
qualified for the job in question”); Jennifer M. Jackson, The Americans with 
Disabilities Act, Mental Illness, and Medication: A Historical Perspective and Hope 
for the Future, 12 MARQ. ELDER’S ADVISOR 219, 242 (2010) (predicting that the 
ADAAA will “shift focus . . . to whether [a plaintiff] is a ‘qualified individual’”); 
Satz, supra note 8, at 989 (warning that “after the ADAAA, courts may shift focus 
. . . to what it means to be ‘qualified’”); Reagan S. Bissonnette, Note, Reasonably 
Accommodating Nonmitigating Plaintiffs After the ADA Amendments Act of 2008,
50 B.C. L. REV. 859, 860 (2009) (predicting that the ADAAA will “direct[] the 
focus of future litigation to whether an individual is a ‘qualified individual’”); 
Valderrama, supra note 25, at 204 (warning that courts might “achiev[e] the same 
result as the restrictive definition of disability” by “end[ing] the inquiry . . . based on 
the plaintiff’s qualifications”).
31. See 42 U.S.C. § 12112(a) (2012) (emphasis added). The ADAAA 
modified the original language prohibiting discrimination against a qualified 
individual “because of the disability of such individual” to “on the basis of 
disability.” See ADAAA, supra note 7, § 5(a)(1) (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 12112(a)). 
This was intended to align the ADA’s language with Title VII. See 154 CONG. REC.
S8347 (daily ed. Sept. 11, 2008) (statement of the Managers to Accompany S. 3406, 
The Americans with Disabilities Act Amendments of 2008); see also Cheryl L. 
Anderson, Unification of Standards in Discrimination Law: The Conundrum of 
Disqualifying Universality 1697 
“qualified individual with a disability,”32 which remains: “an 
individual [with a disability] who, with or without reasonable 
accommodation, can perform the essential functions of the 
employment position that such individual holds or desires.”33 In pre-
ADAAA litigation, an employee’s status as a “qualified” individual 
was typically overshadowed by analysis of the employee’s status as 
an individual “with a disability.”34 Because courts were so willing to 
dismiss cases on a finding of “non-disability,” courts rarely got to the 
qualification issue. 
Unfortunately, evidence is mounting in the growing body of 
post-ADAAA case law to suggest that commentators’ concerns 
about the ADA’s “qualified individual” provision were well-
founded. This Article documents the ways in which the qualification 
requirement is being used to replace disability status as the new 
gatekeeper for ADA protection. More specifically, this Article 
demonstrates how the “essential functions” component of the 
qualifications test has become the critical source for undermining the 
ADAAA. Because the problem is revealing itself in post-ADAAA 
case law, it is easy to describe this development simply as the new 
form of judicial backlash. But judicial backlash does not capture the 
entire story. Just as the original ADA backlash was fueled in part by 
concerted efforts from the business community, the new 
disqualification strategy for undermining the ADAAA is also gaining 
momentum because of sophisticated strategies and narratives by 
employers and by the management-side attorneys and human 
resource professionals who advise them.  
This Article begins in Part I by revealing the role that 
employers and their advisors have played in launching the 
disqualification strategy, and by documenting the empirical evidence 
of this strategy’s success in federal courts. Part II explains more 
specifically how the essential functions concept is enabling “non-
qualified” to replace “non-disabled” as the new gatekeeper for ADA 
                                                                                                               
Causation and Reasonable Accommodation Under the ADA, 82 MISS. L.J. 67, 71 
(2013). 
32. See EEOC, Questions and Answers on the Final Rule Implementing the 
ADA Amendments Act of 2008, ¶ 29 [hereinafter EEOC, Q&A], http://www. 
eeoc.gov/laws/regulations/ada_qa_final_rule.cfm (last visited Oct. 19, 2015). 
33. 42 U.S.C. § 12111(8) (2012). 
34. See Kerri Stone, Substantial Limitations: Reflections on the ADAAA, 14 
N.Y.U. J. LEGIS. & PUB. POL’Y 509, 552-53 (2011) (noting that before the ADAAA, 
“the ‘otherwise qualified’ analysis was subsumed and even eclipsed by the 
disability/coverage analysis” and was “largely ignored by courts and scholars”).
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protection. This development indicates that the welfare-statute view 
of the ADA is still influencing courts to strictly police access to 
workplace accommodations in claims under the “actual” disability 
prong. By shifting the gate-keeping method away from scrutinizing 
who is truly disabled to instead scrutinizing who is truly qualified, 
courts are subtly shifting disability-based stereotypes away from 
individuals with disabilities and onto the workplace itself, which 
may be even more difficult to disrupt. By broadly defining a job’s 
essential functions—and by deferring to employers’ unsubstantiated 
characterizations of essential job functions—courts are embedding 
able-bodied norms into the definition of work itself.  
While Part II focuses on how the essential functions concept is 
limiting access to workplace accommodations for individuals with 
actual disabilities, Part III reveals how the essential functions 
concept is undermining universal impairment-based 
antidiscrimination protection under the “regarded as” prong. Because 
impairment-based discrimination under the “regarded as” prong no 
longer triggers accommodation rights under the ADAAA, the 
essential functions inquiry should have no role to play—just as it 
plays no role in discrimination claims under Title VII on the basis of 
race, color, national origin, religion, or sex. By applying the essential 
functions concept to claims alleging simple impairment-based 
discrimination (as opposed to claims seeking accommodations), 
courts are imposing an artificial hurdle that does not exist for other 
protected statuses under federal antidiscrimination law. Applying the 
essential functions component of the ADA’s qualification 
requirement to “regarded as” claims builds disability stereotypes into 
ADA doctrine by reinforcing the notion that impairments typically 
are related to job performance unless proven otherwise, rather than 
adopting the opposite presumption as is done for protected statuses 
under Title VII. The result is to misalign the ADA from Title VII and 
to relegate impairment to a second-class protected class status.  
Although this analysis highlights the new battleground for the 
disability civil rights struggle, the ADAAA is not a failure. The 
amendments successfully shifted the conversation away from 
policing protected class status, which lays the foundation for 
universalizing and destigmatizing disability, and which pushes courts 
closer to confronting the issues that really matter for combating 
impairment and disability-based decision-making and exclusionary 
workplace design. Yet in order to achieve the ADAAA’s full 
potential, disability rights advocates must proactively confront the 
risks posed by the ADA’s qualification requirement and essential 
Disqualifying Universality 1699 
functions inquiry to help ensure that the ADA retains its stature as a 
core component of federal civil rights law.  
I. THE DISQUALIFICATION STRATEGY: “NOT QUALIFIED” AS THE 
ADA’S NEW GATEKEEPER
When Congress enacted the ADAAA, management-side 
attorneys and human resource organizations recognized the major 
impact that the law would have on covered employers. These 
advisors launched a swift educational campaign to help employers 
understand how the expanded definition of disability also expanded 
employers’ obligations and potential legal risk. In addition to 
advising employers how to modify their practices to comply with the 
expanded legal responsibilities, however, these influential 
intermediaries also went to work identifying new areas of potential 
resistance and alternative sources for litigation defense. Recognizing 
that the ADAAA erects a daunting barrier to employers’ previous 
strategy of challenging an employee’s disability status, management-
side attorneys and human resource (HR) professionals quickly 
converged upon the ADA’s “qualified individual” requirement to 
counteract the ADAAA. Just as scholars and commentators had 
feared, employers were informed in quite specific and pragmatic 
terms about how to embark upon a new “disqualification strategy.” 
Many management-side law firms published newsletters, 
bulletins, and updates for employers explicitly advising them that 
their pre-ADAAA litigation strategy of challenging an employee’s 
disability status should be replaced by challenging employees’ 
qualifications for the job. A typical publication by one management-
side law firm was titled, “An Employer’s Roadmap for Defending 
ADA Claims.”35 The law firm warned employers that because the 
ADAAA had “expanded the definition of a ‘disability,’” it had 
“thereby reduc[ed] the effectiveness of one of an employer’s best 
defenses to a disability claim: that the employee was not disabled.”36
“With the advent of the ADAAA,” the publication explained, “an 
employer’s best chance to defeat a disability discrimination claim 
may require the employer to show that the plaintiff was not a 
qualified individual.”37 Another attorney publication providing 
                                                     
35. Alan Rupe, An Employer’s Roadmap for Defending ADA Claims, LAW 
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guidance to employers similarly warned that the ADAAA had 
largely eliminated the “attractive argument for employers . . . that an 
individual did not have a ‘disability,’” which was the litigation 
strategy that previously had enabled employers to “prevail at
summary judgment.”38 The attorneys explained that “the new 
battleground” should be waged by challenging whether “an 
employee is a qualified individual.”39  
Management-side attorneys and HR consultants did more, 
however, than just identify “disqualification” as a new strategy for 
employers to pursue if they faced an ADAAA lawsuit. They also 
gave specific advice about prelitigation steps that employers should 
take to build the foundation for such a defense. These legal and 
professional advisors urged employers to “[l]ay the groundwork”40
and take “proactive measure[s]”41 in order to “best position 
themselves in the event of a claim,”42 and to “preserve . . . the ‘not 
qualified’ defense.”43
The central piece of advice for employers to preserve a “not 
qualified” defense for ADAAA litigation was to strategically write 
                                                     
38. A. Dean Bennett & Scott E. Randolph, Is Everyone Disabled Under the 
ADA? An Analysis of the Recent Amendments and Guidance for Employers, 36 EMP.
REL. L.J. 1, 5 (2011). 
39. Id. at 7; see also JOHN M. HUSBAND & BRADFORD J. WILLIAMS, YOU
JUST MIGHT FIND . . . YOU GET WHAT YOU NEED—A PRACTICAL GUIDE TO FINDING 
AND MANAGING DISABILITY ACCOMMODATIONS (2010), http://www. 
americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/administrative/labor_law/meetings/2010/annualco
nference/031.authcheckdam.pdf (suggesting that employers focus on “whether 
plaintiffs are ‘qualified individuals’” to defeat claims after the ADAAA); Margaret 
Vroman, Hiring and Firing the Mentally and Psychiatrically Disabled: Advice for 
HR Professionals, CORNELL HR REVIEW (Sept. 16, 2013), http://digitalcommons. 
ilr.cornell.edu/chrr/49/ (advising HR professionals to focus on demonstrating lack of 
qualification in post-ADAAA claims); Frank C. Morris, Jr., ADA Amendments Act: 
Final EEOC Regulations—What Employers Need to Know, SS051 ALI-ABA 1263, 
1268 (2011) (advising employers to “focus on whether the applicant or employee is 
qualified for the job” after the ADAAA).
40. See Frank C. Morris, Jr., Selected ADA Developments, ST001 ALI-
ABA 399, 409 (2011). 
41. See The Importance of Job Descriptions Under the Americans with 
Disabilities Act, THE HUMAN EQUATION, INC., http://www.thehumanequation.com/ 
en/news_rss/articles/2009/12-04-importance-of-job-descriptions-under-americans-
with-disabilities-act.aspx (last visited Oct. 19, 2015). 
42. See Bennett & Randolph, supra note 38, at 8; see also Rupe, supra note 
35 (using case studies to give employers a “roadmap” on “how to preserve, raise and 
present the ‘not qualified’ defense”).
43. See Rupe, supra note 35.
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job descriptions for each position in the firm.44 Employment 
attorneys correctly observed that, even before the ADAAA, courts 
had shown great deference to an employer’s definition of a job’s 
“essential functions” if an employer had listed them in a job 
description prepared before litigation.45 Employment attorneys 
recognized that broadly defining a job’s essential functions would 
help employers use a disqualification strategy later in court. 
Attorneys explained to employers that “a successful ‘unqualified’ 
defense” can be raised if an employer “show[s] that the employee is 
unable to perform the essential functions of the job.”46 “Individuals 
who cannot perform the essential job functions are not considered 
qualified under the ADA, and are therefore not protected by it,” 
explained one HR training organization to employers in a publication 
describing the importance of job descriptions after the ADAAA.47 “A 
job description is often an employer’s first line of defense,” 
employers were advised, “because it is one of the employer’s best 
chances to clearly and unequivocally show the court what it 
considers to be the essential functions of the job.”48
In general, management-side attorneys and HR organizations 
encouraged employers to include all possible essential functions in 
their job descriptions49—i.e., the push was toward being over- rather 
                                                     
44. See, e.g., THE HUMAN EQUATION, INC., supra note 41 (advising that “the 
most effective proactive measure employers can take” to avoid ADAAA liability is 
“written job descriptions”); Stephen C. Sutton, The EEOC Final Regulations Under 
the ADAAA, BAKER HOSTETLER (May 24, 2011), http://www.bakerlaw.com/the-
eeoc-final-regulations-under-the-adaaa-5-24-2011/ (telling employers to “seriously 
consider drafting job descriptions” to avoid ADAAA liability).
45. See, e.g., Morris, supra note 39, at 1268 (advising employers that 
“[p]roperly prepared job descriptions should be afforded considerable weight by the 
EEOC and the courts”); Vroman, supra note 39 (advising HR professionals that 
“[c]ourts give the employer’s judgment great deference when determining the 
essential functions of a job,” and that “an employer may protect itself from liability 
by preparing a written job description before advertising or interviewing applicants 
for the job”).
46. See Rupe, supra note 35. 
47. See THE HUMAN EQUATION, INC., supra note 41 (providing online 
training to employers). 
48. See Rupe, supra note 35 (advising employers that job descriptions can 
establish “evidence regarding the essential functions of the job”); see also Vroman, 
supra note 39 (advising HR professionals that job descriptions are “considered 
evidence of the essential job functions”).
49. See, e.g., Morris, supra note 40, at 409 (encouraging employers to 
“review and update all job descriptions” to include “all essential job functions”); see 
also Sutton, supra note 44 (advising employers “to ensure that the essential 
functions of positions are appropriately defined, documented and supportable”); 
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than under-inclusive in essential function lists. Attorneys 
emphasized, for example, that job functions need not be routine 
aspects of a job to be deemed essential, and that courts would accept 
an employer’s characterization of a task as essential even if it was 
performed “rarely”50 or only “from time to time.”51
Many employment attorneys went even further by suggesting 
specific essential functions for employers to consider adding to their 
job descriptions—items that the attorneys calculated would help 
courts later reject a wide range of potential accommodation requests. 
These suggested essential functions to list in job descriptions 
included, for example, “reading, performing manual tasks, 
concentrating, thinking, communicating, and interacting with 
others.”52 HR advisors urged employers to include not just “functions 
and tasks,” but also “qualifications,” including “education and 
experience requirements.”53 Employers were urged to think 
                                                                                                               
ADAAA REFERENCE TOOLS, BLANK ROME, LLP 1, https://www.blankrome.com/ 
siteFiles/PracticeAreas/7E8ACAB6B3BBF687CF74F741FFE2B009.pdf (advising 
employers to “update their job descriptions to ensure that they include all the 
essential functions of the position”); Thom K. Cope, The ABCs of the ADAAA: What 
Employers Need to Know About Recent Changes to the Americans with Disabilities 
Act, MESCH, CLARK & ROTHSCHILD, http://www.mcrazlaw.com/the-abcs-of-the-
adaaa-what-employers-need-to-know-about-recent-changes-to-the-americans-with-
disabilities-act/ (last visited Oct. 19, 2015) (urging companies to “update job 
descriptions and document the essential functions of every job”); New ADAAA Regs 
Now in Effect! Get Ready for More Lawsuits, HR SPECIALIST (May, 24, 2011), 
http://www.thehrspecialist.com/37254/New_ADAAA_regs_now_in_effect_Get_rea
dy_for_more_lawsuits.hr?cat=hr_management&sub_cat=personnel_files (telling 
employers to “[r]eview your job descriptions to ensure they fully detail each 
position’s essential functions”); Megan Anderson, Employment Edge 123rd 
Edition—Are You Prepared to Comply with the New ADAAA Regulations?, GRAY 
PLANT MOOTY (May 19, 2011), http://www.gpmlaw.com/resources/newsletters/ 
employment-edge-123rd-edition.aspx (urging employers to “revis[e] written job 
descriptions to update the description’s list of ‘essential functions’”).
50. See, e.g., Bill Donahue, Rare Job Tasks Can Be ‘Essential’ Under ADA, 
8th Circ. Says, LAW 360 (Apr. 5, 2013, 2:39 PM), http://www.law360.com/articles/ 
430432/rare-job-tasks-can-be-essential-under-ada-8th-circ-says. 
51. The Ability to Perform a Rare Job Task Can Be “Essential,” FOLEY &
LARDNER, LLP. (Apr. 15, 2013), http://www.foley.com/the-ability-to-perform-a-
rare-job-task-can-be-essential-04-15-2013/ (advising employers that “job tasks can 
indeed be ‘essential’ even if they are not routinely performed,” so employers should 
include in job descriptions “tasks that may need to be performed from time to 
time”).
52. See Anderson, supra note 49 (urging employers to list the ADAAA’s 
new major life activities as essential job functions). 
53. See THE HUMAN EQUATION, INC., supra note 41 (providing online 
training to employers).
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expansively and to consider listing items such as “mathematical 
reasoning ability, willingness to learn, customer service skills, [and] 
experience working on a team.”54 Advisors also recommended that 
employers include “probable physical demands of the position,” such 
as lifting, and include “typical environmental factors affecting the 
position,” such as the ability to tolerate “excessive noise, high 
temperatures, [or] outdoor work in rain and snow.”55 Attorneys also 
emphasized to employers the importance of including “mental,” not 
just “physical,” functions of each job.56
The Society for Human Resource Management (SHRM), which 
is the world’s largest HR membership organization, also gave 
employers a practical tool to help reduce employee claims: a sample 
employment policy that purports to establish the employer as the 
final authority on defining the essential functions of a job.57 The 
sample policy, which is available for free on the Internet, states: 
“Essential functions of the job . . . refers to those job activities that 
are determined by the employer to be essential or core to performing 
the job; these functions cannot be modified.”58 SHRM’s suggestion is 
for employers to adopt the policy and distribute it to their employees 
in advance of litigation. Some attorneys have further advised 
employers to require employees to sign an acknowledgement of the 
essential functions listed in a job description to make it more difficult 
for employees to characterize functions as nonessential during a 
disqualification challenge in later litigation.59
Although it is difficult to assess the impact that management-
side attorneys and HR organizations have had getting employers to 
“lay the foundation” for a disqualification strategy to resist the 
ADAAA’s full effect, preliminary data suggests that employers have 
indeed heeded the advice and that attorneys have begun using the 
                                                     
54. See id.
55. See id.
56. See CHAMBERLAIN HRDLICKA, ATTORNEYS AT LAW, LABOR &
EMPLOYMENT ALERT: HIGHLIGHTS OF THE EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY 
COMMISSION’S FINAL ADAAA REGULATIONS 2 (2011), https://www. 
chamberlainlaw.com/media/news/136_L_E_Alert_EEOC_Final_Regulations_on_ 
ADAAA.pdf (stating that the ADAAA makes it “more important than ever” for job 
descriptions to include all “essential functions (both physical and mental)”).
57. ADA/ADAAA Policy, SOC’Y FOR HUMAN RES. MGMT. (July 3, 2014), 
http://www.shrm.org/templatestools/samples/policies/pages/adaadaaapolicy.aspx. 
58. Id. (emphasis added). 
59. See, e.g., HUSBAND & WILLIAMS, supra note 39 (advising that 
“[e]mployees should also be apprised of—and ideally acknowledge their agreement 
with—the essential functions of their positions”).
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new strategy successfully in federal courts.60 Because the ADAAA 
applies only to alleged discriminatory conduct that occurred after the 
statute’s effective date,61 courts applied pre-ADAAA law to many 
cases during a lengthy transition period after the ADAAA’s 
enactment. That period offered a unique data set for analysis because 
courts were simultaneously deciding some cases under pre-ADAAA 
law and some under the ADAAA, depending upon whether the 
allegations were based on employer conduct that took place before or 
after January 1, 2009.62
Professor Stephen Befort conducted an empirical analysis of 
case decisions during that transition phase to help assess employers’ 
new litigation strategies and their effectiveness in federal courts.63
His study reviewed all reported federal district court summary 
judgment decisions in ADA cases from January 1, 2010, through 
April 30, 2013.64 Specifically, Befort analyzed whether employers 
were responding to the ADAAA by shifting their asserted grounds 
for seeking summary judgment from challenging the employee’s 
disability status to challenging the employee’s qualifications, and if 
so, whether that strategy was succeeding.65 The data answered both 
questions in the affirmative.66
On the positive side, the data reveals that the ADAAA is 
achieving its intended effect of making it harder for employers to 
challenge an employee’s disability status.67 While district courts 
                                                     
60. See generally Stephen F. Befort, An Empirical Examination of Case 
Outcomes Under the ADA Amendments Act, 70 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 2027 (2013) 
(describing data showing that employers have increased their use of a 
disqualification strategy in defending claims under the ADAAA). 
61. See Reynolds v. Am. Nat’l Red Cross, 701 F.3d 143, 151-52 (4th Cir. 
2012). 
62. See Befort, supra note 60, at 2046, 2049-50.
63. See id.
64. Id. at 2046-49 (describing the methodology for collecting and coding 
cases). 
65. See id. at 2050-57. 
66. See id. at 2057-66. 
67. See id. at 2057-58; see also Porter, Backlash, supra note 25, at 4, 19-47 
(analyzing case law and concluding that the ADAAA has “made it much easier for a 
plaintiff to satisfy the threshold question of whether the individual meets the 
statutory definition of disability”); NAT’L COUNCIL ON DISABILITY, A PROMISING 
START: PRELIMINARY ANALYSIS OF COURT DECISIONS UNDER THE ADA
AMENDMENTS ACT 13 (2013), https://www.ncd.gov/rawmedia_repository/7518fc55_ 
8393_4e76_97e4_0a72fe9e95fb.pdf (finding that the ADAAA “has had a dramatic 
impact in improving the success rates of plaintiffs in establishing disability”); Stein 
et al., supra note 28, at 719-21 (analyzing cases from the first half of 2013 and 
concluding that “plaintiffs have fared markedly better than pre-ADAAA plaintiffs 
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applying pre-ADAAA law granted summary judgment for the 
employer in 74.4% of cases in which the employer challenged the 
employee’s disability status, district courts applying the ADAAA 
granted summary judgment for the employer in only 45.9% of cases 
in which the motion was sought on that ground.68 That represents a 
28.5 percentage point drop in pro-employer summary judgment 
rulings under the ADAAA when employers challenged an 
employee’s status as an individual with a disability.69 If anything, 
that finding likely underestimates the magnitude of the shift, as it 
only measures employers’ win rate in cases in which the employer 
contested disability status, which fails to capture the ADAAA’s 
effect of increasing cases in which employers do not challenge an 
employee’s disability status at all.70  
In contrast to this positive finding, the data also reveals an 
opposite trend for summary judgment motions in which employers 
contest the employee’s status as a qualified individual. As predicted, 
employers are challenging an employee’s qualifications as a basis for 
seeking summary judgment in a larger percentage of cases after the 
ADAAA than they did before.71 While district courts only ruled on 
challenges to an employee’s qualifications in 28.2% of summary 
judgment cases governed by pre-ADAAA law, employers raised a 
qualification challenge that was resolved at summary judgment in 
47.1% of cases governed by the ADAAA.72 Not only are employers 
contesting qualifications more frequently under the ADAAA, but 
courts are also responding more favorably to those challenges in 
post-amendment cases. In claims governed by pre-ADAAA law, 
district courts granted employers summary judgment on 
qualifications grounds in 47.9% of the cases in which employers 
raised a qualification issue.73 That win rate for employers rose to 
69.7% in cases governed by the ADAAA, which represents a 21.8 
                                                                                                               
on the determination of whether they met the initial requirement [of] . . . being a 
person with a disability”).
68. Befort, supra note 60, at 2050-51, 2057-58. 
69. Id. at 2051, 2058. 
70. Id. at 2051. Another reason that the data may underestimate the effect is 
“that the plaintiffs’ bar is pushing the envelope by asserting more marginal claims of 
disability status, thereby dampening the decline in employer win rates.” Id.
71. Id. at 2055, 2064. 
72. Id.  
73. Id. at 2055. 
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percentage point increase in the rate of employer success on 
summary judgment when using the disqualification strategy.74
Overall, these results indicate that the ADAAA is likely to 
make less progress for employees than advocates had hoped, as the 
ADAAA’s gains from broadening the disability definition are being 
partially offset by losses from raising the bar on establishing job 
qualifications.75 In a recent training session by the National 
Employment Law Institute for employment lawyers, a director 
summarized these ADAAA results by explaining that although 
courts “have been pretty favorable . . . to plaintiffs” on the issue of 
disability status, “courts have been pretty favorable to employers” on 
qualification challenges.76
What this data reveals, more broadly, is the risk that “non-
qualified” may replace “non-disabled” as the new gate-keeping 
mechanism erected by opponents to disability rights and federal 
judges who continue to view the ADA as a welfare statute for a 
minority group rather than a civil rights law.77 Unless disability rights 
advocates and plaintiffs’ attorneys recognize and resist this trend, the 
courts’ treatment of the qualifications hurdle may undermine the 
congressional goal of universal impairment-based antidiscrimination 
protection.78 As explained below, this shift away from focusing on 
disability status toward using a disqualification strategy is 
particularly pernicious because it imbeds disability and impairment-
based stereotypes and assumptions into the definition of work and 
                                                     
74. Id. (cautioning that “the post-amendment outcomes are relatively few in 
number (thirty-three),” which may impact reliability).
75. See id. at 2068, 2071; see also Stein et al., supra note 28, at 721 
(finding evidence that judicial resistance “may be shifting from the determination on 
summary judgment of disability to the determination on summary judgment of 
qualifications”).
76. See C. Reilly Larson, NELI Speakers Discuss Legal Trends, Offer 
Practical Guidance Under Amended ADA, 71 DAILY LAB. REP. C-1 (2014) (quoting 
NELI’s Director of ADA and Equal Employment Opportunity Services, David 
Fram); see also Stein et al., supra note 28, at 722-23 (identifying cases in which 
plaintiffs prevailed on disability status “only to lose on summary judgment on the 
determination of whether they were qualified”).
77. Cf. Amy Knapp, The Danger of the “Essential Functions” Requirement 
of the ADA: Why the Interactive Process Should Be Mandated, 90 DENV. U. L. REV.
715, 732 (2012) (arguing that “[i]f the essential functions requirement of the 
ADAAA is used as a gatekeeper for disability discrimination claims, it . . . could 
undermine the disability rights movement”).
78. See Stein et al., supra note 28, at 719 (arguing that “the ADAAA may 
prove illusory” if “the only result is to shift judgments . . . from the determination of 
disability to . . . the determination that the plaintiff is qualified”).
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the workplace itself, making them even more difficult to recognize 
and disrupt.  
II. USING “ESSENTIAL FUNCTIONS” TO SHIFT DISABILITY 
STEREOTYPES FROM THE WORKER TO THE WORKPLACE
The key to employers’ success in shifting to a disqualification 
strategy has been the “essential functions” component of the statute’s 
“qualified individual” requirement. As explained above, the ADAAA 
expanded the definition of disability but did not significantly change 
the rest of the statute. The ADA’s core substantive provision 
continues to prohibit discrimination not against all individuals with 
disabilities, but only against “qualified” individuals with 
disabilities.79 The amendments did not alter the ADA’s definition of 
a “qualified individual with a disability,”80 which remains: “an 
individual [with a disability] who, with or without reasonable 
accommodation, can perform the essential functions of the 
employment position that such individual holds or desires.”81  
The “essential functions” concept—which is absent from Title 
VII—was included in the ADA to help define the accommodation 
                                                     
79. See 42 U.S.C. § 12112(a) (2012). 
80. See EEOC, Q&A, supra note 32, ¶ 29. 
81. 42 U.S.C. § 12111(8) (2012); see also Kevin M. Barry, Exactly What 
Congress Intended?, 17 EMP. RTS. & EMP. POL’Y J. 5, 33 n.157 (2013) (noting 
“much concern about provisions of the ADA left untouched by the ADAAA, such as 
‘essential functions’”). The regulations define “qualified” to require an individual 
with a disability to perform all essential job functions and also to satisfy “the 
requisite skill, experience, education and other job-related requirements.” See 29
C.F.R. § 1630.2(m) (2015). This second part of the definition is analogous to the 
qualification element of a Title VII prima facie case using the McDonnell Douglas
framework, which focuses just on the minimal, objective requirements for the job. 
See William H. Danne, Jr., Annotation, Who Is “Qualified Individual” Under 
Americans with Disabilities Act Provisions Defining, and Extending Protection 
Against Employment Discrimination to Qualified Individual with Disability (42 
U.S.C.A. §§ 12111(8), 12112(a)), 146 A.L.R. FED. 1, §§ 2[a], 9 (1998) [hereinafter 
Who Is Qualified Individual] (drawing this parallel); see also infra notes 264-72 and 
accompanying text. This second part of the definition has been a much lower hurdle 
for plaintiffs than the essential functions requirement. See Who Is Qualified 
Individual, supra, § 2[a] (reviewing pre-ADAAA case law); see also Michel Lee, 
Searching for Patterns and Anomalies in the ADA Employment Constellation: Who 
Is a Qualified Individual with a Disability and What Accommodations Are Courts 
Really Demanding?, 13 LAB. LAW. 149, 170 (1997) (concluding from pre-ADAAA 
case law that “[w]hether a job applicant or employee has the requisite proficiencies 
for a position tends to be a rather concrete determination which does not often arise 
as a significant controversy”).
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mandate by preventing employers from invoking marginal job tasks 
to disqualify individuals with disabilities.82 While the purpose of the 
essential functions component was to focus the accommodation 
inquiry on parts of the job that really matter,83 courts are instead 
using the concept to replace disability status as a new gatekeeper for 
ADA protection. Although this possibility existed before the 
amendments,84 courts addressed the “qualified individual” 
requirement infrequently because it became so easy for employers to 
obtain dismissals by arguing that the plaintiff did not meet courts’ 
narrow interpretation of disability. Now that the ADAAA has 
curtailed that prior strategy, the essential functions concept is taking 
center stage in ADA litigation and its shortcomings are becoming 
more evident. 
Courts treat the ADA’s “qualified individual” provision as a 
required element of the plaintiff’s prima facie disability 
discrimination case.85 The employee bears the burden of proving that 
he or she can perform all essential functions of the job with or 
without accommodation in order to seek ADA protection.86 When an 
employer disputes the employee’s assertion that he or she can 
perform the essential functions, some courts require the employer to 
put forth evidence establishing that the challenged function is indeed 
essential and cannot be performed with or without reasonable 
accommodation.87 But the ultimate burden of persuading the fact-
finder of the ability to perform all essential job functions remains 
with the employee.88
                                                     
82. See Who Is Qualified Individual, supra note 81, § 2[a]. 
83. See Travis, Leveling, supra note 12, at 972-74. 
84. See W. Robert Gray, The Essential-Functions Limitation on the Civil 
Rights of People with Disabilities and John Rawls’s Concept of Social Justice, 22 
N.M. L. REV. 295, 297, 304 (1992) (arguing that “the essential-functions standard is 
an exclusionary concept” that “promises to be a legal impediment to the 
achievement of equality”).
85. See infra notes 282-84 and accompanying text. This is regardless of 
whether the case uses the McDonnell Douglas or mixed-motive burden-shifting 
framework. See infra notes 336-39 and accompanying text. 
86. See Branham v. Snow, 392 F.3d 896, 905 (7th Cir. 2004); EEOC v. 
Amego, Inc., 110 F.3d 135, 144 (1st Cir. 1997). 
87. See EEOC v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 477 F.3d 561, 568 (8th Cir. 2007); 
Benson v. Nw. Airlines, Inc., 62 F.3d 1108, 1113 (8th Cir. 1995); Richardson v. 
Friendly Ice Cream Corp., 594 F.3d 69, 76 (1st Cir. 2010); Kleiber v. Honda of Am. 
Mfg., Inc., 485 F.3d 862, 869 (6th Cir. 2007); see also Valderrama, supra note 25, at 
183-84 (describing the inconsistency in case law on the burden of proof structure for 
essential functions). 
88. See Benson, 62 F.3d at 1113; Richardson, 594 F.3d at 76. 
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The problem with the essential functions concept is not just that 
the statute fails to define the term, but that the statute sets the stage 
for employers to step in and fill that void. Specifically, the statute 
states that “consideration shall be given to the employer’s judgment 
as to what functions of a job are essential, and if an employer has 
prepared a written description before advertising or interviewing 
applicants for the job, this description shall be considered evidence 
of the essential functions of the job.”89 The EEOC’s regulations
attempt to provide a definition and a more complete framework for 
the essential function inquiry.90 According to the regulations, “[t]he 
term essential functions means the fundamental job duties of the 
employment position” and “does not include the marginal functions 
of the position.”91 The regulations state that  
job function[s] may be considered essential for any of several reasons, 
including but not limited to the following: 
 (i)  The function may be essential because the reason the position 
exists is to perform that function;  
 (ii)  The function may be essential because of the limited number of 
employees available among whom the performance of that job 
function can be distributed; and/or  
 (iii)  The function may be highly specialized so that the incumbent in 
the position is hired for his or her expertise or ability to perform 
the particular function.92  
The regulations also suggest a range of evidence that courts should 
consider in assessing the essential or marginal nature of a job 
function, which  
includes, but is not limited to:  
 (i)  The employer’s judgment as to which functions are essential; 
 (ii)  Written job descriptions prepared before advertising or 
interviewing applicants for the job;  
 (iii)  The amount of time spent on the job performing the function;  
 (iv)  The consequences of not requiring the incumbent to perform the 
function;  
 (v)  The terms of a collective bargaining agreement;  
 (vi)  The work experience of past incumbents in the job; and/or  
                                                     
89. 42 U.S.C. §12111(8) (2012). 
90. See 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(n)(1) (2015). 
91. Id. (emphasis omitted). 
92. Id. § 1630.2(n)(2). 
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 (vii)  The current work experience of incumbents in similar jobs.93
While these regulations attempt to establish the type of fact-
intensive and case-specific inquiry that is necessary to determine the 
essential functions of widely diverse positions, the regulations are 
not binding on courts, which have paid them little regard.94 Many 
courts give dispositive or nearly dispositive weight to just the two 
evidentiary sources mentioned in the statute: the employer’s 
judgment and written job descriptions.95 As a result, the essential 
functions determination no longer plays the circumscribed role of 
defining the boundary of an employer’s accommodation mandate, 
but instead becomes a gatekeeper for legal protection. Even more 
concerning is that judicial deference to employers’ judgment is 
allowing employers themselves (and the attorneys who advise them) 
to control the operation of this entry gate.  
Judicial deference to employers’ judgment in identifying the 
essential job functions is not just a post-amendment phenomenon. 
Even before the ADAAA, scholars had observed that the foremost 
type of evidence that courts consider in determining essential job 
functions “is the employer’s own judgment as to whether a particular 
job function is essential.”96 Written job descriptions, in particular, 
have always been among the most frequently cited sources for 
establishing the essential nature of job functions.97 Courts have 
routinely invoked judicial noninterference with managerial 
prerogatives as a way to avoid meaningful scrutiny of the essential 
functions of a job.98 These long-time trends were less concerning in 
                                                     
93. Id. § 1630.2(n)(3). 
94. See Ruth Colker, The Americans with Disabilities Act: A Windfall for 
Defendants, 34 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 99, 144-60 (1999) (demonstrating the low 
level of deference that federal courts have shown to EEOC regulations interpreting 
the ADA). 
95. See Michelle A. Travis, Recapturing the Transformative Potential of 
Employment Discrimination Law, 62 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 3, 25 (2005) [hereinafter 
Travis, Recapturing].  
96. See Who Is Qualified Individual, supra note 81, § 2[a]; see also id. §
33[a] (compiling pre-ADAAA cases); Travis, Recapturing, supra note 95, at 21-35.
97. See Who Is Qualified Individual, supra note 81, § 34[a] (compiling pre-
ADAAA cases). 
98. See Grant T. Collins & Penelope J. Phillips, Overview of Reasonable 
Accommodation and the Shifting Emphasis from Who Is Disabled to Who Can Work,
34 HAMLINE L. REV. 469, 486 (2011) (observing “a strong judicial trend toward 
noninterference in determining what constitute the essential duties of a job”); Lee, 
supra note 81, at 170-77 (concluding from pre-ADAAA case law that “courts have 
generally been unwilling to second guess the employer’s assessment of essential 
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pre-ADAAA litigation because such a high percentage of cases were 
being dismissed on disability status grounds.99 As employer 
deference on defining essential job functions starts becoming 
entrenched in post-ADAAA opinions, the impact is being magnified 
as far more cases are being litigated on qualification grounds. 
In post-ADAAA cases, courts have continued to ignore both 
the statutory language and the regulatory framework that mandates 
only “consideration” of an employer’s judgment as one of many 
evidentiary sources. Courts have instead described an employer’s 
judgment as being subject to “substantial”100 or “significant”101
deference or weight, and as being “highly probative”102 in 
determining the essential job functions. “Whether a particular duty is 
an essential function of an identified job,” explained a recent district 
court, “is based largely on the employer’s judgment as to what 
functions of a job are essential.”103 If an employer says that a 
particular function “may be required,” courts may deem that function 
essential even if the plaintiff is an incumbent employee who has 
never had to perform the function.104 This deferential approach was 
                                                                                                               
functions”); Stein et al., supra note 28, at 723 (describing cases that “credit rather 
than contest the employer’s definition of qualifications and essential job functions”).
99. See Knapp, supra note 77, at 729-30 (“Because so many cases under the 
original ADA focused on whether a plaintiff had a disability, case law concerning 
whether a plaintiff can perform the essential functions of a job . . . is less 
developed.”).
100. See, e.g., Chin-McKenzie v. Continuum Health Partners, 876 F. Supp. 
2d 270, 290 (S.D.N.Y. 2012) (stating that “an employer’s identification of essential 
job duties is a business judgment to which a court must give substantial deference” 
(citation omitted)); Harty v. City of Sanford, No. 6:11-cv-1041-Orl-31KRS, 2012 
WL 3243282, at *6 (M.D. Fla. Aug. 8, 2012) (giving employer’s view “substantial 
weight” in determining essential job functions); Kinghorn v. Gen. Hosp. Corp., No. 
11-12078-DPW, 2014 WL 3058291, at *5 (D. Mass. July 1, 2014) (giving
“substantial weight to the employer’s view of job requirements” (citation omitted)).
101. See Jones v. Nationwide Life Ins. Co., 696 F.3d 78, 88 (1st Cir. 2012) 
(giving “significant degree of deference” to employer’s judgment about essential job 
functions, although not deciding ADAAA’s applicability (citation omitted)).
102. See Knutson v. Schwan’s Home Serv., Inc., 711 F.3d 911, 914 (8th Cir. 
2013) (“The employer’s judgment about an essential job function is considered 
highly probative.” (citation omitted)); Mashek v. Soo Line R.R. Co., No. 11-487 
(MJD/JJG), 2012 WL 6552795, at *6 (D. Minn. Dec. 14, 2012) (same). 
103. See Chin-McKenzie, 876 F. Supp. 2d at 290 (citation omitted); see also 
Kinghorn, 2014 WL 3058291, at *5 (stating that the essential functions inquiry “is 
not intended to second guess the employer” (citation omitted)).
104. See Knutson, 711 F.3d at 915 (holding that plaintiff’s “specific personal 
experience [as an incumbent employee on the job] is of no consequence in the 
essential functions equation” if a job function is deemed essential according to “the 
employer’s judgment” and a “written job description” (citation omitted)).
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recently reinforced by EEOC Commissioner Chai Feldblum, who 
was asked in a public forum how the essential functions of a job 
should be determined.105 “‘The bottom line,’” Feldblum responded, 
“‘is [that] it’s the employer that decides.’”106
In extreme cases, courts’ deference to employers may allow the 
qualifications requirement to override the ADA’s antidiscrimination 
mandate altogether by permitting employers to define “the absence 
of a disability” as itself an essential job function. In Hoback v. City 
of Chattanooga, for example, a police officer who had PTSD after 
returning from a military deployment in Iraq brought an ADA claim 
against the city for deeming him unfit for duty and discharging 
him.107 The plaintiff’s condition met the expanded definition of 
disability under the ADAAA, so the employer focused on a 
disqualification strategy by challenging the employee’s ability to 
perform the essential job functions.108 The trial court permitted the 
police chief to testify to the jury as to the essential functions of a 
police officer position.109 Rather than just explaining the specific 
tasks that police officers must accomplish on the job, the police chief 
was allowed to tell the jury that police officers “have to be of sound 
mind, clear-thinking, able-bodied people in good physical health and 
mental health.”110
The police chief’s testimony in Hoback would be similar to an 
employer in a sex discrimination case saying that employees “have 
to be male” or in a race discrimination case saying that employees 
“have to be white.” Such testimony would be an admission of a 
facially discriminatory practice, and the employer’s only defense 
would be to prove that the status was a “bona fide occupational 
qualification” (BFOQ) for the job.111 The BFOQ defense is not 
                                                     
105. See Kevin P. McGowan, EEOC’s Views on Accommodation Under 
Amended ADA Discussed, BLOOMBERG BNA (Jan. 10, 2012), http://www.bna.com/ 
eeocs-views-accommodation-n12884906922/. 
106. See id. (alteration in original).
107. No. 1:10-CV-74, 2012 WL 3834828, at *1-2 (E.D. Tenn. Sept. 4, 2012). 
108. Id. at *2, *4-5.
109. Id. at *6. 
110. Id. (citation omitted). The jury nevertheless found for the employee, and 
the court denied the employer’s motion for a new trial or judgment as a matter of 
law because the employee’s mental health professionals testified that he was able to 
perform the essential functions of a police officer’s job. See id. at *1, *4, *7. 
111. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(e)(1) (2012); cf. Gray, supra note 84, at 297 
(stating that “[n]o analogue exists” to the essential functions requirement for 
individuals with disabilities “for other groups suffering discrimination, save perhaps 
for the very limited exception of the bona fide occupational qualification”).
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available in race discrimination claims,112 so an employer’s testimony 
that employees “have to be white” would establish automatic 
liability. In cases involving sex, religion, or national origin, the 
employer would have to meet a very high standard to prove a BFOQ 
defense, which is treated as an extremely narrow exception to the 
prohibition against status-based discrimination.113 To lawfully select 
only men for a position, for example, an employer would have to 
show that hiring women would undermine the essence of the 
business operation itself.114
By allowing an employer to assert that being “able-bodied” and 
of “sound mind” are essential job functions, the employer effectively 
gets a finding that being non-disabled is a BFOQ without having to 
prove the very demanding requirements for that defense.115 Although 
Title VII’s BFOQ defense and the ADA’s essential function concept 
play a similar role in providing legal cover for status-based 
employment decision-making, the BFOQ defense operates only at 
the margins of Title VII law, while the essential functions concept 
operates at the heart of ADA litigation.116 This difference reflects an 
unwillingness to embrace a real presumption against status-based 
decision-making for disability as is done for other protected 
statuses—i.e., a presumption that the status is irrelevant to job 
performance unless the employer proves otherwise. The ADA’s 
essential functions concept instead builds in an assumption that 
impairments typically are relevant to performance unless the 
employee can prove him or herself truly capable for the job.117 The 
essential functions concept thus marks disability as a second-class 
                                                     
112. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(e)(1). 
113. See Gray, supra note 84, at 330 (describing the BFOQ defense as “an 
extremely narrow exception . . . to the general prohibition of discrimination against 
the protected class” (emphasis omitted)); see also W. Air Lines, Inc. v. Criswell, 472 
U.S. 400, 412 (1985). 
114. See Gray, supra note 84, at 329 (quoting Dothard v. Rawlinson, 433 
U.S. 321, 333 (1977)). 
115. See id. at 330 (noting that the BFOQ defense “is construed narrowly,” 
while the essential functions analogue is construed “broadly”).
116. See id. (explaining that the BFOQ defense operates at Title VII’s 
“periphery,” while the essential functions concept “remains at the center of 
disabilities law”).
117. Cf. Knapp, supra note 77, at 731 (arguing that using the essential 
functions concept as a screening device “would reflect the courts’ view that 
disabilities negatively affect job performance, and that employers generally act 
rationally when they take adverse employment action against individuals with 
disabilities”).
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protected class from all other protected classes under federal 
antidiscrimination law.118
Courts’ receptiveness to employers’ disqualification strategy in 
post-ADAAA litigation may be exacerbated by the strict reading that 
some courts are giving to recent Supreme Court decisions regarding 
the pleading standard for a complaint to survive a motion to 
dismiss.119 In Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, the Court held that a 
plaintiff must plead allegations demonstrating “a plausible 
entitlement to relief,” rather than allegations showing only a 
possibility of relief or that are merely consistent with a legal claim.120
In Ashcroft v. Iqbal, the Court reiterated this standard, holding that 
“[t]o survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint must contain sufficient 
factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is 
plausible on its face.’”121 While the full impact of this “plausible 
entitlement” pleading standard on ADAAA claims remains unclear, 
several courts have applied it to dismiss pre-ADAAA cases because 
the plaintiff did not allege facts both identifying the essential 
functions of the job at issue and alleging the ability to perform all 
essential job functions.122 If other courts act similarly, this could 
                                                     
118. See Gray, supra note 84, at 330 (arguing that because of the ADA’s 
essential functions concept, “people with disabilities as a class suffer from the 
broadest legal exclusion from employment and from society of any group otherwise 
protected from discrimination by law”); see also Knapp, supra note 77, at 732 
(arguing that the essential functions concept “reinforces the common stereotype that 
individuals with disabilities are lesser human beings” by “systematically 
scrutiniz[ing]” their “real or perceived limitations”).
119. See Charles A. Sullivan, Plausibly Pleading Employment 
Discrimination, 52 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1613 (2011) (analyzing how Twombly and 
Iqbal affect a plaintiff’s ability to plead an employment discrimination claim).
120. 550 U.S. 544, 559 (2007). 
121. 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570). 
122. See, e.g., Jackson v. Napolitano, No. CV-09-1822-PHX-LOA, 2010 WL 
94110, at *1, *5 (D. Ariz. Jan. 5, 2010) (applying Iqbal and Twombly in a pre-
ADAAA case and granting employer’s motion to dismiss complaint for “fail[ing] to 
set forth any facts regarding the essential functions of the job and that he was able to 
perform those specific functions”); Longariello v. Phx. Union High Sch. Dist., No. 
CV-09-1606-PHX-LOA, 2009 WL 4827014, at *4-5 (D. Ariz. Dec. 15, 2009) 
(same); see also Who Is Qualified Individual, supra note 81, § 2[b] (advising 
plaintiffs’ lawyers that an ADA “complaint may be dismissed if it does not allege 
that the plaintiff was able to perform the essential functions of the job in question”). 
But see Snider v. U.S. Steel-Fairfield Works Med. Dep’t, No. 2:12-cv-03508-AKK, 
2013 WL 1278973, at *1-3 (N.D. Ala. Mar. 26, 2013) (applying Iqbal and Twombly
and denying employer’s motion to dismiss ADAAA complaint by concluding that 
qualifications issues are “more appropriate at the summary judgment stage”).
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further restrict the ADAAA’s impact as employers are turning to a 
disqualification strategy early in litigation. 
While plaintiffs’ lawyers need to be aware of this over-arching 
strategy of shifting from challenging a plaintiff’s disability status to 
challenging a plaintiff’s qualifications, three distinct methods of 
“disqualification” are emerging as particular areas of concern. 
Section A analyzes courts’ tendency to treat structural workplace 
norms as essential job functions, which removes from scrutiny the 
biased ways in which employers organize when and where the actual 
job functions get done. Section B reveals courts’ tendency to 
mischaracterize qualification standards as essential job functions, 
thereby relieving employers of the obligation to prove the business 
necessity for using the standard to determine job eligibility. Section 
C highlights how courts are blurring the statute’s “direct threat” 
defense into the essential functions analysis, which reinforces 
stereotypes about individuals with disabilities both as threats to 
others and as lacking the capacity to assess their own personal risks. 
All three of these patterns illustrate the potential reach and impact of 
the new disqualification approach. 
A. Treating Organizational Norms as Essential Job Functions 
Perhaps the most concerning trend within the broader 
disqualification strategy is judges’ willingness to apply the essential 
functions concept not just to actual job functions, but also to 
employer decisions about when and where those functions are 
accomplished. These organizational decisions are often embedded so 
deeply into the structural norms of the workplace that courts view 
them not just as the way in which work typically gets done, but as a 
defining feature of work itself.123 These embedded workplace 
structures include, in particular, various components of the “full-
time, face-time norm,” which is the assumption that work must be 
done at a central worksite, in full-time positions, with unlimited 
scheduling flexibility, unlimited hour availability, and an 
uninterrupted work–life capacity.124
Although these workplace norms are conceptually distinct from 
the actual work tasks or duties that make up a particular job and 
                                                     
123. See Travis, Recapturing, supra note 95, at 7-33; see also Porter, 
Backlash, supra note 25, at 73 (“[M]ost judges assume that jobs are defined by their 
structural norms, which leads judges to hold that the structural norms are essential 
functions.”).
124. See Travis, Recapturing, supra note 95, at 9-10.
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therefore should not be characterized as job functions—essential or 
otherwise—courts have begun routinely treating employers’ on-site 
attendance, shift, and hour requirements as essential functions of 
nearly every job.125 Because the ADA’s accommodation mandate 
does not require employers to modify any aspect of a job that is 
deemed an essential function, this characterization disqualifies a 
large and diverse group of individuals with disabilities who need 
some type of scheduling modification, hour limitation, or temporary 
leave in order to continue performing the actual functions of a job.126
Characterizing the when and where of workplace performance 
as an essential job function is inconsistent with the ADA’s statutory 
language and regulations.127 As explained above, the purpose of the 
essential functions concept is to define the boundaries of an 
employer’s accommodation obligation. Essential functions, by 
definition, are the job duties that are not subject to the ADA’s 
accommodation mandate.128 The ADA and its regulations, however, 
explicitly define reasonable accommodations to include scheduling 
changes, flexible hour arrangements, part-time work, unpaid leave, 
and other forms of job restructuring.129 An employer’s scheduling, 
hour, and attendance requirements cannot, therefore, be essential 
functions of every job. If such policies and practices were essential 
functions, then modifications to those policies and practices would 
not be listed as potential accommodations.130
Nevertheless, courts began applying the essential functions 
concept to organizational norms even before Congress amended the 
ADA.131 Although many scholars had criticized courts for 
undermining the ADA by too narrowly defining the protected 
class,132 a few scholars had also warned about the risk of courts 
undermining the ADA by too broadly defining the essential functions 
of a job.133 In the relatively small set of pre-ADAAA cases in which 
courts got beyond disability status and decided the case on 
qualification grounds, courts tended to unquestioningly accept 
                                                     
125. See infra notes 136-60 and accompanying text. 
126. See Travis, Recapturing, supra note 95, at 19-33; see also Porter, 
Backlash, supra note 25, at 70-78.
127. See Travis, Recapturing, supra note 95, at 43-72.
128. See id. at 48-49. 
129. See id.
130. See id.
131. See id. at 19-33. 
132. See, e.g., Feldblum, supra note 6, at 139-60. 
133. See, e.g., Travis, Recapturing, supra note 95, at 21-33. 
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employers’ characterization of on-site attendance, scheduling, and 
hour requirements as essential job functions.134 Critics warned that 
such an approach, if allowed to continue unchecked, could place 
sweeping aspects of the workplace beyond the reach of the ADA’s 
accommodation mandate.135
Unfortunately, the small set of pre-ADAAA cases indicating 
the risk of judicial over-reaching on the essential functions inquiry 
have now become a disturbing pattern. In a review of post-ADAAA 
decisions, Professor Nicole Porter has found sufficient evidence of 
courts treating organizational norms as essential job functions to 
warrant labeling this trend the “new backlash against the ADA.”136
While Porter found that employees successfully are getting past 
summary judgment on qualifications challenges when the disputed 
job functions involve “the physical aspects of the job,” she found the 
opposite when the disputed job functions involve “the structural 
norms of the workplace”—i.e., “the ‘when’ and ‘where’ the work 
was performed.”137 Specifically, Porter found that courts are readily 
applying the essential function label in post-ADAAA cases to a wide 
range of employer decisions about “schedules, shifts, hours, and 
attendance policies.”138 Once a court characterizes an organizational 
structure as an essential job function, that structure is not subject to 
the ADA’s accommodation mandate, which ends up excluding any 
individual whose disability requires even a very modest scheduling 
change.139
Courts frequently invoke the mantra that “attendance is an 
essential function” as a shorthand way of rejecting ADAAA claims 
by such individuals.140 In Brown v. Honda of America, the employee 
                                                     
134. See id.; see also Who Is Qualified Individual, supra note 81, §§ 2[a], 
40-41 (summarizing pre-ADAAA case law showing that “employer expectations” 
regarding attendance, tardiness, and timeliness “have been deemed to constitute 
essential functions of all or most jobs”); Porter, Backlash, supra note 25, at 78 
(explaining that although structural norm cases “appeared in the pre-ADAAA case 
law, we saw relatively few . . . because so many cases were dismissed solely on the 
issue of disability” (footnote omitted)).
135. See Travis, Recapturing, supra note 95, at 18-33.
136. See Porter, Backlash, supra note 25, at 5, 70-78. 
137. Id. at 70. 
138. See id. at 71. 
139. See id. at 70 (“Because the only way to accommodate an employee who 
cannot work a particular schedule or shift is to eliminate the requirement[,] . . . 
courts then conclude that accommodation is not required because it is never an 
appropriate accommodation to eliminate an essential function of the job.”).
140. See, e.g., Brown v. Honda of Am., No. 2:10-cv-459, 2012 WL 4061795, 
at *5 (S.D. Ohio Sept. 14, 2012).  
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was fired for “excessive unexcused absences.”141 The employee 
alleged that the employer had failed to accommodate her 
“depression, anxiety, and migraine headaches” by providing 
additional intermittent leave.142 As is becoming more common under 
the ADAAA, the employer did not challenge the plaintiff’s disability 
status, but instead sought summary judgment on qualification 
grounds.143 The district court accepted the employer’s 
characterization of “regular and reliable attendance” as an essential 
function of a Production Associate’s job, and therefore deemed the 
plaintiff unqualified and granted the employer summary judgment.144
Although the plaintiff could perform the actual job functions when at 
work—and despite the fact that the statute and the regulations list 
unpaid leave as a form of reasonable accommodation—the court not 
only treated the organizational time norm as a job “function,” but 
failed to allow a jury to determine its essential nature.145
In Basden v. Professional Transportation, Inc., the Seventh 
Circuit affirmed summary judgment for an employer on similar 
grounds.146 The employee was fired from her dispatcher’s position 
after requesting a thirty-day leave to get medical treatment for 
possible multiple sclerosis.147 Rather than focusing on the plaintiff’s 
ability to perform the actual job functions when she would return 
from her temporary medical leave, the district court deferred to the 
employer’s characterization of “regular attendance as an essential job 
requirement” and deemed the plaintiff unqualified, therefore 
dismissing her claim.148 Despite finding that the employer failed to 
                                                     
141. Id. at *1. 
142. Id. at *1, *4. 
143. Id. at *1 n.1. 
144. Id. at *1, *4. 
145. Id. at *4-5.
146. 714 F.3d 1034, 1036 (7th Cir. 2013). 
147. Id. at 1037. 
148. Id. at 1036-39; see also Lewis v. N.Y.C. Police Dep’t, 908 F. Supp. 2d 
313, 326-28 (E.D.N.Y. 2012) (dismissing ADA claim because “excessive absences” 
rendered plaintiff unqualified to perform essential function of regular attendance); 
Blackard v. Livingston Parish Sewer Dist., No. 12-704-SDD-RLB, 2014 WL 
199629, at *3-5 (M.D. La. Jan. 15, 2014) (dismissing ADA claim because 
“excessive tardiness and absenteeism” rendered plaintiff unqualified to perform 
essential function of “regular attendance”); Fuentes v. Krypton Solutions, LLC, No. 
4:11cv581, 2013 WL 1391113, at *1-4 (E.D. Tex. Apr. 4, 2013) (dismissing ADA 
claim because “repeated tardiness and excessive absences” rendered plaintiff 
unqualified to perform essential function of “regular attendance”); Brangman v. 
AstraZeneca, LP, 952 F. Supp. 2d 710, 722-23 (E.D. Pa. 2013) (dismissing ADA 
claim by characterizing accommodation request as one for “indefinite leave,” 
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properly engage in the ADA’s required interactive process to identify 
accommodations, the Seventh Circuit nonetheless affirmed the 
dismissal on the grounds that “the employee fail[ed] to present 
evidence sufficient to reach the jury on the question of whether she 
was able to perform the essential functions of her job.”149
The Sixth Circuit recently took the same approach in an en 
banc decision affirming summary judgment for the employer in 
EEOC v. Ford Motor Co.150 Without citing any statutory or 
regulatory support, the court asserted a “general rule . . . that 
regularly attending work on-site is essential to most jobs.”151 The 
court then deferred to the employer’s judgment that daily, face-to-
face office interaction was an essential job function of a resale steel 
buyer position, and therefore deemed the employee unqualified 
because her irritable bowel syndrome required her to work from 
home multiple days a week.152 This opinion was particularly 
disappointing because the Sixth Circuit panel decision had correctly 
reversed summary judgment based on a full, fact-specific inquiry 
that had revealed a triable issue on whether the employee could 
perform her actual job duties from home.153
Courts have reached similarly disappointing results when 
employees seek to accommodate a disability through schedule or 
shift changes, flextime, limited overtime, or part-time work. Tucker 
v. Missouri Department of Social Services provides one example 
involving a requested shift modification.154 In Tucker, the employee 
was fired after falling asleep during the overnight shift at his job as a 
Youth Specialist.155 The employee brought an ADAAA claim 
alleging that the employer had failed to accommodate his migraines, 
which required medication that made him drowsy, by scheduling him 
only during the day and evening shifts.156 The employer sought 
                                                                                                               
rendering plaintiff unqualified); Coker v. Enhanced Senior Living, Inc., 897 
F. Supp. 2d 1366, 1378-79 (N.D. Ga. 2012) (characterizing “regular attendance” as 
essential job function, but finding triable issue on plaintiff’s attendance record).
149. Basden, 714 F.3d at 1038-39. 
150. 782 F.3d 753, 757-58 (6th Cir. 2015) (en banc). 
151. Id. at 761. 
152. Id. at 763. 
153. EEOC v. Ford Motor Co., 752 F.3d 634, 640-47 (6th Cir. 2014), reh’g 
en banc granted, opinion vacated (Aug. 29, 2014). 
154. No. 2:11-CV-04134-NKL, 2012 WL 6115604, at *2 (W.D. Mo. Dec. 
10, 2012). 
155. Id. at *1-2.
156. Id. at *2-3.
1720 Michigan State Law Review  2015:1689 
summary judgment.157 Just as Congress had intended under the 
ADAAA, the district court did not focus on the employee’s disability 
status, which the employer did not appear to challenge.158 Instead, the 
employer challenged the employee’s qualifications for the job.159 The 
district court accepted the employer’s judgment—which the court 
described as “highly probative”—that the ability to work the day, 
evening, and overnight shifts was an essential job function.160
Although it was undisputed that limiting the employee to only day 
and evening shifts would allow him to perform the actual job 
functions during those times, the court deemed the employee 
unqualified and granted the employer summary judgment.161
What is particularly disturbing about this trend is that it embeds 
the same disability-based stereotypes that the ADA was intended to 
disrupt back into the definition of the workplace itself. The full-time, 
face-time norm is an able-bodied norm.162 It presumes a worker who 
has unlimited and uninterrupted physical stamina, and it prioritizes 
that above a worker’s actual ability to perform required tasks. By 
characterizing aspects of the full-time, face-time norm as defining 
features of work—i.e., as essential functions of nearly all jobs—
those disability-based stereotypes are shielded from the ADA’s 
reach.  
Demanding that courts properly treat attendance, shift, hour, 
and scheduling practices not as job functions, but as organizational 
norms for when and where the actual functions take place, would not 
force courts to ignore real impacts that an individual’s disability may 
have on performance. It would simply force courts to meaningfully 
analyze those impacts in a fact-specific inquiry about the 
“reasonableness” of the employee’s modification request and about 
whether the impact meets the high standard of “undue hardship” to 
eliminate the employer’s accommodation obligation. By incorrectly 
characterizing attendance, shift, hour, and scheduling practices as 
essential job functions, those aspects of the workplace are rendered 
automatically untouchable by the ADA. As a result, many 
individuals with disabilities are automatically disqualified from jobs 
that are built upon unscrutinized able-bodied assumptions and norms.  
                                                     
157. Id. at *1.  
158. See id. at *3.  
159. Id. at *3-5.
160. Id. at *4 (citation omitted). 
161. Id. at *6. 
162. See Travis, Recapturing, supra note 95, at 10-11. The full-time, face-
time norm is also a male norm. See id.
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B. Mischaracterizing Qualification Standards as Essential Job 
Functions 
The second concerning trend that is emerging within the 
disqualification strategy is the mischaracterization of employer-
adopted qualification standards as essential job functions. This is 
more than a semantic error, as it has major consequences in 
establishing the burden of proof and therefore the scope of an 
employee’s rights. 
Under the ADA, “essential functions” and “qualification 
standards” are supposed to delineate distinct categories of job 
requirements with different legal rules.163 As explained above, 
essential functions are defined as “the fundamental job duties of the 
employment position.”164 Qualification standards, in contrast, are 
defined as “the personal and professional attributes including the 
skill, experience, education, physical, medical, safety and other 
requirements” that an employer establishes for job eligibility.165
While essential functions focus on the job’s required tasks, 
qualification standards focus on the employee’s required attributes.166
As explained above, employees have the burden to demonstrate their 
ability to perform the essential job functions to meet the “qualified 
individual” requirement of a prima facie disability discrimination 
case, and courts give great deference to employers’ characterization 
of a job function as “essential.” Qualification standards, in contrast, 
are supposed to receive special scrutiny when they have an 
exclusionary effect on individuals with disabilities. That required 
scrutiny gets bypassed when a court mischaracterizes a qualification 
standard as an essential function of a job.  
The special scrutiny is established in the ADA’s definition 
section, which defines unlawful discrimination to include: “using 
qualification standards . . . that screen out or tend to screen out an 
individual with a disability or a class of individuals with disabilities 
unless the standard . . . is shown to be job-related for the position in 
                                                     
163. See John E. Rumel, Toward an “Unqualified” Otherwise Qualified 
Standard: Job Prerequisites and Reasonable Accommodation Under the Americans 
with Disabilities Act, 18 EMP. RTS. & EMP. POL’Y J. 35, 46 (2014).
164. 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(n)(1) (2015). 
165. Id. § 1630.2(q). 
166. Cf. Stone, supra note 34, at 513-14, 551-63 (arguing that the ADA’s 
qualifications requirement should focus on “necessary job skills” rather than 
“essential functions”).
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question and is consistent with business necessity.”167 In the ADA’s 
section defining employer defenses, the statute reinforces the 
employer’s burden to affirmatively defend exclusionary qualification 
standards. That section states that when an employee alleges that a 
qualification standard “screen[s] out or tend[s] to screen out or 
otherwise den[ies] a job or benefit to an individual with a disability,” 
the employer may only defend the standard by showing that it is 
“job-related and consistent with business necessity.”168
When a court mischaracterizes a qualification standard as a job 
function, the employer is never put to the task of proving the 
business necessity of using the standard for job eligibility. Instead, 
the employer need only describe the standard as “essential” rather 
than “marginal,” to which courts readily defer, particularly if stated 
in a job description. Mischaracterizing a qualification standard as an 
essential job function thus affects the burden of proof in a very 
significant way: It shifts the burden away from the employer to 
defend the necessity of the requirement and onto the employee to 
prove his or her ability to meet the requirement to obtain protection 
under the ADA. As a result of this mischaracterization, employers 
are empowered to use unnecessary qualification standards to exclude 
individuals with disabilities from the workplace. 
Management-side attorneys and HR advisors are facilitating 
this mischaracterization by advising employers to include various 
qualification standards in the list of “essential functions” in their job 
descriptions. Some advisors are quite explicit, urging employers to 
include in their job descriptions not just “functions and tasks,” but 
also “qualifications,” including “education and experience 
requirements.”169 Others simply suggest essential functions that 
employers are encouraged to include in their job descriptions, and 
those suggested lists contain items that are qualification standards 
                                                     
167. 42 U.S.C. § 12112(b)(6) (2012). This standard also applies to 
“employment tests or other selection criteria.” Id. The ADA mentions two specific 
qualification standards: (1) a requirement “that an individual shall not pose a direct 
threat to the health or safety of other individuals in the workplace,” id. § 12113(b) 
(addressed supra Section II.C); and (2) a requirement of “uncorrected vision,” which 
is subject to the same business necessity defense, id. § 12113(c). 
168. Id. § 12113(a). The ADA also obligates employers to provide 
reasonable accommodations to enable employees to meet qualification standards, so 
an employer may be liable even when it proves business necessity if a reasonable 
accommodation exists. See id.; see also Rumel, supra note 163, at 57-72 (analyzing 
how the accommodation mandate may also apply to job prerequisites). 
169. See THE HUMAN EQUATION, INC., supra note 41 (providing online 
training to employers). 
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rather than job functions. Some attorneys, for example, have 
encouraged employers to list general capacities as essential 
functions, such as the ability to read, to concentrate, to think, to 
communicate, and to interact with others.170 Other attorneys have 
suggested that employers list a wide range of employee attributes as 
essential functions, including “mathematical reasoning ability, 
willingness to learn, customer service skills, [and] experience 
working on a team.”171 These are not job functions, tasks, or duties, 
but instead fall within the definition of a qualification standard that 
establishes “the personal and professional attributes including the 
skill, experience, education, physical, medical, safety and other 
requirements” for job eligibility.172 Once these qualification standards 
find their way onto a job description’s list of “essential functions,” 
however, that label sticks, which relieves employers of their statutory 
obligation to prove business necessity. 
This strategy appears to be working, as several courts have 
granted employers summary judgment on ADAAA claims by 
characterizing a qualification standard as a job function, deferring to 
an employer’s job description listing the function as essential, and 
thereby deeming the employee unqualified for the job.173 The Eighth 
Circuit’s decision in Knutson v. Schwan’s Home Service, Inc.
provides an example.174 In Knutson, the plaintiff was a general 
manager for several years, and he excelled in his job.175 He then 
suffered an eye injury but continued to work successfully for nine 
months.176 An eye doctor then examined his progress and decided not 
                                                     
170. See Anderson, supra note 49 (urging employers to list the ADAAA’s 
new major life activities as essential job functions). 
171. See THE HUMAN EQUATION, INC., supra note 41. 
172. 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(q) (2015). 
173. See, e.g., Jones v. Nationwide Life Ins. Co., 696 F.3d 78, 87-89 (1st Cir. 
2012) (mischaracterizing licensing exam as an essential job function rather than a 
qualification standard and deeming employee unqualified for not completing the 
exam); Mashek v. Soo Line RR Co., No. 11-487 (MJD/JJG), 2012 WL 6552795, at 
*5-6 (D. Minn. Dec. 14, 2012) (mischaracterizing Rail Association guideline that 
employees in safety-sensitive positions be seizure free for one year as an essential 
job function rather than a qualification standard and deeming employee unqualified 
for not meeting the rule); Thomas v. Werthan Packaging, Inc., No. 3:10-cv-00876, 
2011 WL 4915776, at *5-8 (M.D. Tenn. Oct. 17, 2011) (mischaracterizing a twenty-
pound lifting requirement as an essential job function rather than a qualification 
standard and deeming plaintiff unqualified due to his lifting restrictions); see also 
infra notes 174-79 and accompanying text. 
174. 711 F.3d 911 (8th Cir. 2013). 
175. Id. at 913. 
176. Id.
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to grant him a Medical Examiner’s Certificate (MEC), which the 
plaintiff needed to retain his Department of Transportation (DOT) 
qualification to drive trucks weighing over 10,000 pounds.177 The 
employer fired the plaintiff for not being DOT qualified to drive 
delivery trucks.178 The employee argued that he could perform his 
general manager position without DOT qualification because he only 
had to drive a delivery truck occasionally in his two years on the job 
and he could make deliveries in his personal vehicle when needed.179
Although the physical act of driving a delivery truck would 
correctly be characterized as a job function, the requirement that all 
managers obtain DOT qualification and a corresponding MEC is not 
a job function, but a qualification standard. The district court 
mischaracterized the DOT qualification standard as a job function, 
however, and then deferred to the employer’s view that it was 
essential to a general manager’s position.180 The court therefore 
granted the employer summary judgment on the plaintiff’s ADAAA 
claim, finding the plaintiff unqualified for the job.181 The Eighth 
Circuit affirmed, explaining that the employer’s job description listed 
DOT qualification and medical certification as a job requirement and 
stating that “[t]he employer’s judgment about an essential job 
function is considered highly probative.”182 The court held that the 
plaintiff’s “specific personal experience is of no consequence in the 
essential functions equation,” and instead found “the written job 
description [and] the employer’s judgment” to be dispositive.183  
If the court had properly characterized the DOT requirement as 
a qualification standard rather than an essential job function, the 
employer would have been required to prove that it was “job-related 
and consistent with business necessity”184 because it tends to screen 
out individuals with visual and other impairments. Meeting the 
employer’s burden of proof on business necessity would have 
required more than just pointing to a job description. The plaintiff’s 
experience on the job could have been sufficient to raise a genuine 
issue on “business necessity” to at least get the case to a jury. 
Instead, the employer got the case dismissed before trial based 
                                                     
177. Id.
178. Id.
179. Id. at 914-15. 
180. Id. at 915-16. 
181. Id. at 913. 
182. Id. at 914 (citation omitted). 
183. Id. at 915 (citation omitted). 
184. See 42 U.S.C. § 12113(a) (2012).  
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simply on its “judgment” that DOT certification was essential for the 
job. 
In Griffin v. Prince William Health System, a district court 
similarly erred by mischaracterizing the employer’s forty-pound 
lifting requirement as a job function rather than a qualification 
standard for a nurse in the Special Procedures Department.185 The 
plaintiff was fired from her long-time nurse’s position after a back 
injury resulted in a twenty-five pound lifting restriction.186 The court 
deferred to the employer’s job description that “identifie[d] lifting 
forty pounds as an essential function of the job,” declared the 
plaintiff unqualified, and granted the employer summary judgment 
on the plaintiff’s ADAAA claim.187  
If the court had correctly characterized the forty-pound lifting 
requirement as a qualification standard, the employer would have 
had the burden to prove that it was “job-related and consistent with 
business necessity.”188 The evidence recited in the district court’s 
opinion raised a question as to whether the forty-pound requirement 
was necessary or was arbitrarily selected.189 Although the evidence 
indicated that nurses often were involved in “lifting, turning, and 
positioning patients,” and that a nurse might need to “hold[] or 
lower[] patients to the floor” if a patient became dizzy, the evidence 
also indicated that patients “could weigh up to 250 to 300 pounds, 
and when sedated, were considered ‘dead weight.’”190 The fact that 
the employer did not impose a 300-pound lifting requirement 
suggests that the nurses had some means for moving patients without 
bearing a patient’s full weight, which raises a question of whether 
the ability to lift forty pounds (as opposed to some lesser amount) 
was really necessary. The evidence also indicated that nurses were 
assigned to patients in pairs,191 which raises the possibility that not all 
nurses would need to lift forty pounds. While the business necessity 
defense could go either way, a correct characterization of the lifting 
requirement as a qualification standard would at least have
demanded serious inquiry into the requirement’s necessity and may 
have gotten the case past summary judgment.  
                                                     
185. No. 10:10-cv-359, 2011 WL 1597508, at *4 (E.D. Va. Apr. 26, 2011). 
186. Id. at *1-2.
187. Id. at *4-5.
188. See 42 U.S.C. § 12113(a).  
189. See Griffin, 2011 WL 1597508, at *4-5.
190. Id. at *1, 4. 
191. Id. at *4. 
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C. Blurring the Direct Threat Defense into the Essential Job 
Functions Analysis 
The third concerning trend within the disqualification strategy 
involves judicial interpretation of the ADA’s “direct threat” 
provisions.192 These specific provisions—like the more general 
“essential functions” concept—do not exist in Title VII. While few 
courts have focused on the direct threat provisions in post-ADAAA
claims, the cases raise the risk that these provisions may further 
cement the second-class status of disability relative to other protected 
statuses in federal antidiscrimination law.  
The connection between the direct threat provisions and 
employers’ disqualification strategy is not immediately obvious 
because these provisions are located in the ADA’s section on 
employer defenses. As explained in Section II.B above, the ADA 
provides that an employer may defend against claims alleging the 
discriminatory application of a qualification standard by showing 
that the standard is “job-related and consistent with business 
necessity.”193 The ADA lists as one such qualification standard: “a 
requirement that an individual shall not pose a direct threat to the 
health or safety of other individuals in the workplace.”194 The 
statute’s definition section clarifies that the direct threat defense 
applies only to “a significant risk to the health or safety of others that 
cannot be eliminated by reasonable accommodation.”195 Yet, despite 
the narrow framing of the direct threat concept, courts may begin 
paying increased attention to these provisions in the wake of the 
ADAAA as an additional way to ratchet up the qualifications 
requirement. 
This risk exists in part because many courts have failed to treat 
“direct threat” as an affirmative defense on which employers bear the 
burden of proof,196 even though the direct threat provisions are in the 
                                                     
192. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 12111(3), 12113(a)-(b). 
193. See id. § 12113(a). 
194. See id. § 12113(b). 
195. Id. § 12111(3). 
196. Circuit courts are split on whether the employee bears the burden “as 
part of his[/her] obligation to show that he[/she] is a ‘qualified’ individual with a 
disability (by showing that he[/she] is not a direct threat to safety in the workplace),” 
or whether the employer bears the burden “as part of an . . . affirmative defense (that 
the plaintiff was a direct threat to safety).” Wurzel v. Whirlpool Corp., 482 F. App’x 
1, 12 n.14 (6th Cir. 2012); see also Borgialli v. Thunder Basin Coal Co., 235 F.3d 
1284, 1291-95 (10th Cir. 2000) (describing the case law split); Rizzo v. Children’s 
Disqualifying Universality 1727 
ADA’s “defenses” section.197 Instead, courts often treat direct threat 
issues as a qualifications question.198 As a result, some courts are 
placing the burden on employees to prove that they do not pose a 
direct threat to themselves or others as a required part of the 
“qualified individual” element of the prima facie case.199 In doing so, 
these courts effectively deem the absence of any direct threat to be a 
per se essential function of every job.200
While that may sound like a reasonable way to advance 
workplace safety, the legitimacy of such an approach—which exists 
solely in the context of disability and not for any other protected 
                                                                                                               
World Learning Ctrs., Inc., 213 F.3d 209, 212-13 (5th Cir. 2000) (en banc) (same); 
Branham v. Snow, 392 F.3d 896, 906 n.5 (7th Cir. 2004) (same). 
197. See 42 U.S.C. § 12113. 
198. See, e.g., Wurzel, 482 F. App’x at 9-11, 10 n.10 (describing direct threat 
as a “qualifications” issue); Borgialli, 235 F.3d at 1295 (holding employee was “not 
a qualified person” because his impairment made him “a direct threat to others”); 
LaChance v. Duffy’s Draft House, Inc., 146 F.3d 832, 834-36 (11th Cir. 1998) 
(affirming dismissal because employee “was not a qualified individual because he 
could not perform the essential functions of the job without threat of harm to himself 
or others”); Estate of Mauro v. Borgess Med. Ctr., 137 F.3d 398, 402 (6th Cir. 1998) 
(holding an employee “is not ‘qualified’ . . . if he or she poses a ‘direct threat’ to the 
health or safety of others which cannot be eliminated by a reasonable 
accommodation”); Darnell v. Thermafiber, Inc., 417 F.3d 657, 660 (7th Cir. 2005) 
(“An individual is not qualified if he presents a ‘direct threat.’”).
199. See, e.g., LaChance, 146 F.3d at 836 (holding that “[t]he employee 
retains at all times the burden of persuading the jury . . . that he was not a direct 
threat” as part of the qualifications element of a prima facie ADA case); EEOC v. 
Amego, Inc., 110 F.3d 135, 144 (1st Cir. 1997) (holding that “plaintiff must 
demonstrate that she can perform [the essential] functions in a way that does not 
endanger others”); cf. EEOC v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 477 F.3d 561, 571-72 (8th 
Cir. 2007) (holding that “the employer bears the burden of proof, as the direct threat 
defense is an affirmative defense”); Branham, 392 F.3d at 906 (placing burden on 
employer “to show that an employee posed a direct threat to workplace safety that 
could not be eliminated by a reasonable accommodation” (citation omitted)); 
Lovejoy-Wilson v. NOCO Motor Fuel, Inc., 263 F.3d 208, 219 (2d Cir. 2001) 
(describing “direct threat” as an “affirmative defense[]”); Hutton v. Elf Atochem N. 
Am., Inc., 273 F.3d 884, 893 (9th Cir. 2001) (“Because it is an affirmative defense, 
the employer bears the burden of proving that an employee constitutes a direct 
threat.”).
200. One court has taken a more nuanced approach. See Amego, Inc., 110 
F.3d at 144 (holding that when the “essential job functions necessarily implicate the 
safety of others, plaintiff must demonstrate that she can perform those functions in a 
way that does not endanger others,” but when “the issue of direct threat is not tied to 
the issue of essential job functions but is purely a matter of defense, [then] the 
defendant would bear the burden”); see also Rizzo, 213 F.3d at 220-22 (en banc) 
(suggesting that the burden should be on the employee when an alleged risk relates 
to “the ability to perform a particular job function safely,” but on the employer when 
an alleged risk relates to “a general threat to the health or safety of others”).
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status—is undermined by the fact that it may be applied even if the 
alleged risk has nothing to do with an employee’s job performance 
and even if the risk played no causal role in the adverse employment 
action. By housing the direct threat analysis in the qualifications 
component of the employee’s prima facie case, courts eliminate the 
employer’s obligation to demonstrate the business necessity of an 
alleged safety standard that excludes individuals with impairments 
from the workplace.  
This effect is illustrated most dramatically in cases where the 
alleged threat posed by an impairment is solely to the employee’s 
own safety or health. Although the ADA defines “direct threat” to 
include only “significant risk[s] to the health or safety of others,”201
the Supreme Court has held that the direct threat provisions also 
apply when an employee’s impairment poses a significant risk to him 
or herself.202 In the case that established this principle, the Court 
allowed an employer to invoke “direct threat” to disqualify an 
employee from an oil refinery job because workplace toxins might 
exacerbate the employee’s liver condition, which had no bearing on 
the employee’s performance.203 Allowing such paternalism to 
disqualify an employee from antidiscrimination protection on the 
basis of any other protected status under Title VII would likely be 
met with outrage, and the Supreme Court explicitly rejected such an 
attempt in the context of sex discrimination over twenty years ago.204
Yet, when the risk is linked to one’s impairment or disability, 
paternalism becomes an acceptable basis for disqualifying the 
individual from employment opportunities.  
While the ADA purports to prohibit employers from acting 
upon disability-based stereotypes, it allows employers to invoke just 
such biases through the direct threat provisions. The existence of the 
direct threat provisions for disability—but not for any protected 
status under Title VII—builds into ADA doctrine the stereotyped 
view that individuals with disabilities pose unique risks to 
                                                     
201. 42 U.S.C. § 12111(3) (emphasis added); see also id. § 12113(b) 
(defining qualification standards to “include a requirement that an individual shall 
not pose a direct threat to the health or safety of other individuals in the workplace” 
(emphasis added)). 
202. See Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Echazabal, 536 U.S. 73, 79-87 (2002). 
203. Id. at 76-78.
204. See Int’l Union, United Auto., Aerospace & Agric. Implement Workers 
of Am., UAW v. Johnson Controls, Inc., 499 U.S. 187, 206-07 (1991) (holding that 
an employer may not exclude women who are capable of bearing children from jobs 
at a battery manufacturing plant because of the risk that lead exposure may pose to a 
future fetus). 
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themselves and others in the workplace205 and that they are not 
competent to assess the personal risks they are willing to take for 
economic security. This problem is compounded by courts’ highly 
deferential application of the direct threat defense, under which 
courts have been particularly receptive to employers’ arguments 
when mental illness or other stigmatized impairments are involved.206
Judges often allow employment decision-makers’ “personal 
perceptions of acceptable risks” to substitute for rigorous, 
individualized, medical assessments,207 which allows the direct threat 
provisions to give effect to some of the same disability-based fears, 
stereotypes, and biases that the ADA was intended to combat.208
The direct threat provisions may become more significant 
under the ADAAA as employers shift focus away from challenging 
disability status to challenging employees’ qualifications. In post-
ADAAA cases, courts have used “direct threat” to disqualify 
employees with impairments ranging from a back injury209 to 
angina,210 which are far afield of the contagious diseases that were 
                                                     
205. Some courts have expressed this bias openly. See, e.g., Rizzo, 213 F.3d 
at 219 (Jones & Smith, JJ., dissenting) (describing the “common sense [notion] that 
an employee’s ability to do the job, and to do so safely, is a matter of heightened 
concern when it comes to disability, and has a special meaning not present in the 
context of age or sex”).
206. See Michelle A. Travis, The Part and Parcel of Impairment 
Discrimination, 17 EMP. RTS. & EMP. POL’Y J. 35, 85 (2013); see also Brian S. 
Prestes, Disciplining the Americans with Disabilities Act’s Direct Threat Defense,
22 BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 409, 420, 422-36 (2001) (finding pre-ADAAA cases 
imposing low evidentiary burden on employers to prove direct threat defense, 
particularly for mental illness or other stigmatized impairments). 
207. See Ann Hubbard, Understanding and Implementing the ADA’s Direct 
Threat Defense, 95 NW. U. L. REV. 1279, 1281-82 (2001) (arguing that courts’ 
lenient approach to proving the direct threat defense “shields from scrutiny 
‘common-sense,’ but nevertheless erroneous, assessments of the risks posed by an 
employee who happens to have a disability”); Prestes, supra note 206, at 420 
(arguing that employers get “free reign to impose their judgments of significant risk” 
to support a direct threat defense). 
208. See Prestes, supra note 206, at 422-36 (arguing that “[t]he disabled 
individuals most feared, misunderstood, or stigmatized by society remain less 
protected as a result of an unanchored direct threat analysis”).
209. See Cleveland v. Mueller Copper Tube Co., No. 1:10CV307-SA-SAA, 
2012 WL 1192125, at *8-9 (N.D. Miss. Apr. 10, 2012) (dismissing ADAAA claim 
by concluding that plaintiff “would have constituted a direct threat to her safety” as 
a block-crane operator). 
210. See Wurzel v. Whirlpool Corp., 482 F. App’x 1, 1, 19-20 (6th Cir. 
2012) (affirming dismissal by finding plaintiff unqualified because his angina posed 
a direct threat in a manufacturing plant due to risk of arterial spasms causing sudden 
incapacitation). 
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the source of the direct threat provisions in the first place.211 These 
cases illustrate yet another way in which the qualifications 
component of an ADA prima facie case may serve as a new 
gatekeeper for legal protection against disability-based 
discrimination in the workplace.  
D. Sources of Optimism 
While these three trends highlight the potential power that the 
disqualification strategy may have in undermining the ADAAA, 
several sources of optimism also exist. Some plaintiffs’ attorneys 
have been able to successfully educate a few courts about the proper 
role of the ADA’s qualification requirement and essential functions 
inquiry.212 These litigants recognized at the outset of litigation that 
the battleground has shifted from disability status to qualifications, 
and they proactively framed their cases to challenge either the 
general presumption of employer deference or the specific 
mischaracterization of structural norms or qualification standards as 
essential job functions. This small set of encouraging cases should 
provide a template for plaintiffs’ lawyers trying to preemptively 
counter a disqualification attack when litigating cases under the 
ADAAA.  
The most important victories have been the small set of 
ADAAA cases in which courts were persuaded to meaningfully 
engage in a multi-factor, fact-specific inquiry of the essential 
functions of a job.213 In Thomas v. Werthan Packaging, Inc., for 
example, a district court explicitly rejected the employer’s position 
“that courts should defer to an employer in deciding what functions 
are essential to particular jobs.”214 The court instead embraced the 
entire regulatory framework for assessing essential job junctions and 
correctly stated that “[e]mployer judgment is merely one of the seven 
factors for the court to consider.”215 The court found support for the 
EEOC’s multi-factor approach in the ADA’s introductory section on 
                                                     
211. See Hubbard, supra note 207, at 1297-301. 
212. See infra notes 213-41 and accompanying text.  
213. See, e.g., Shelton v. Price Waterhouse Coopers, LLP, No. 8:12-cv-
02757-T, 2014 WL 2581348, at *5-6 (M.D. Fla. May 2, 2014) (citing EEOC’s 
multi-factor analysis and holding that “[w]hether a particular function is essential is 
a fact-specific inquiry evaluated on a case-by-case basis by examining a number of 
factors” (citation omitted)).
214. No. 3:10-cv-00876, 2011 WL 4915776, at *6 (M.D. Tenn. Oct. 17, 
2011). 
215. Id.
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congressional findings,216 which states that one purpose of the statute 
is “to ensure that the Federal Government plays a central role in 
enforcing [the statutory protections] . . . on behalf of individuals with 
disabilities.”217 That purpose, the court concluded, would not be 
advanced by deferring to employers’ judgment on the essential 
functions of a job.218
The Sixth Circuit applied similar scrutiny in Rorrer v. City of 
Stow, in which the court held that the fact-specific nature of 
determining essential job functions typically renders resolution 
improper at the summary judgment stage.219 The court adopted the 
EEOC’s entire, multi-factor approach and held that neither “the 
employer’s judgment” nor “[w]ritten job descriptions” will “be 
dispositive on whether a function is essential.”220 The court 
emphasized that the ADA only requires “consideration” of an 
employer’s assessment, but not “deference,” which would 
“incorrectly imply[] that the employer’s position creates a strong 
presumption in its favor.”221 “If an employer’s judgment about what 
qualifies as an essential task were conclusive,” explained the court, 
“an employer that did not wish to be inconvenienced by making a 
reasonable accommodation could, simply by asserting that the 
function is essential, avoid the clear congressional mandate” for 
reasonable accommodations.222
Unfortunately, the Sixth Circuit back-pedaled on this position 
in its en banc decision in EEOC v. Ford Motor Co., in which it 
deferred to an employer’s characterization of full-time, on-site 
presence as an essential job function.223 This contrary approach 
reveals courts’ particular willingness to empower employers to 
define structural and organizational norms as essential job functions, 
even when courts are willing to scrutinize an employer’s judgment 
about the necessity of specific job tasks, as was the case in Rorrer.
The thoughtful dissent in Ford Motor, however, offers an 
encouraging model for litigants in other jurisdictions by correctly 
recognizing that Rorrer’s individualized, fact-intensive, case-specific 
                                                     
216. See id. (citing 42 U.S.C. § 12101(b)(3) (2006)). 
217. 42 U.S.C. § 12101(b)(3). 
218. See Thomas, 2011 WL 4915776, at *6. 
219. 743 F.3d 1025, 1039 (6th Cir. 2014). 
220. Id. at 1039-40 (citation omitted). 
221. Id. at 1042 (citing 42 U.S.C. § 12111(8) (2012); Feldman v. Olin Corp., 
692 F.3d 748, 755 (7th Cir. 2012)). 
222. Id. at 1039 (emphasis and citation omitted). 
223. 782 F.3d 753, 763 (6th Cir. 2015) (en banc). 
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analysis should be applied with equal vigor to organizational 
structures and conventional time norms.224 The dissent would have 
adopted the Sixth Circuit’s panel decision that was vacated by the en 
banc review.225 The panel decision had emphasized that a court’s 
inquiry on essential job functions “does not end simply because [the 
employer] has expressed [its] business judgment.”226 “[If] we allow 
employers to redefine the essential functions of an employee’s 
position to serve their own interests,” the panel opinion explained, 
“[then we would] abdicate our responsibility as a court to company 
personnel boards.”227
In addition to these positive opinions that may help weaken the 
reflexive judicial presumption of employer deference, a few litigants 
have gotten courts to question employers’ characterization of 
structural norms as essential job functions, unlike in Ford Motor.228
In Shelton v. Price Waterhouse Coopers, LLP, for example, the 
employer sought summary judgment on an ADAAA claim by 
arguing that the employee’s poor attendance record rendered her 
unqualified to perform the essential job function of “regular, on-site 
attendance.”229 The district court correctly focused on the job’s actual 
tasks and found a triable issue as to whether the employee could 
perform those tasks remotely by working periodically from home.230
By refusing to defer unquestioningly to the employer’s 
characterization of a structural norm as an essential job function, the 
                                                     
224. Id. at 770-77 (Moore, J., dissenting). 
225. See id.
226. EEOC v. Ford Motor Co., 752 F.3d 634, 642 (6th Cir. 2014), reh’g en 
banc granted, opinion vacated (Aug. 29, 2014). 
227. Id.
228. See, e.g., Thomas v. Bala Nursing Ret. Ctr., No. 11-5771, 2012 WL 
2581057, at *7 (E.D. Pa. July 3, 2012) (denying employer summary judgment by 
correctly treating plaintiff’s tardiness not as an inability to perform the essential 
function of attendance but as an asserted reason for termination subject to pretext 
analysis); Peirano v. Momentive Specialty Chems., Inc., No. 2:11-CV-00281, 2012 
WL 4959429, at *11 (S.D. Ohio Oct. 17, 2012) (finding triable issue on whether 
“punctuality” was essential job function); Fleck v. Wilmac Corp., No. 10-05562, 
2012 WL 1033472, at *8-10 (E.D. Pa. Mar. 27, 2012) (denying employer summary 
judgment by correctly analyzing plaintiff’s need for modified work schedule as a 
potential accommodation that would enable performance of actual job functions); 
Munoz v. Nutrisystem, Inc., No. 13-4416, 2014 WL 3765498, at *3-10 (E.D. Pa. 
July 30, 2014) (finding triable issue on whether employee with sleep apnea was 
qualified despite violating attendance policy because her request for “short breaks, 
opportunities to stand and stretch, and periodic days off” might be a reasonable 
accommodation). 
229. No. 8:12-cv-02757, 2014 WL 2581348, at *5 (M.D. Fla. May 2, 2014). 
230. Id. at *6. 
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court denied the employer’s motion and allowed the case to 
proceed.231
Plaintiffs have also made some headway in getting courts to 
understand that an employer’s demand for uninterrupted attendance 
is not a job function, essential or otherwise, despite employers’ use 
of the essential function label.232 Some courts are recognizing that an 
employee’s need for a finite, unpaid leave to get medical treatment, 
rehabilitation, or otherwise address an illness or injury may be a 
reasonable accommodation that could enable an employee to 
perform the actual essential job functions upon the employee’s 
return.233 As a result, some courts are denying motions to dismiss on 
qualifications grounds when a triable issue exists on whether an 
employer’s denial of short-term, unpaid leave constitutes a failure to 
accommodate.234 These cases may be opening a window for the 
ADAAA to begin dismantling the disability-based stereotypes that 
have become entrenched in the definition of “work.”
While plaintiffs’ lawyers are beginning to educate courts on the 
important difference between structural norms and job functions, the 
EEOC may be starting a similar education role on the distinction 
between essential functions and qualification standards. In one recent 
case, the EEOC brought an ADAAA claim on behalf of a class of 
employees challenging United Parcel Service’s rule limiting medical 
leaves to twelve months.235 UPS moved to dismiss, arguing that the 
ability to return to work after a multiple-month absence was “an 
essential job function,” which rendered the employees unqualified.236
                                                     
231. Id. at *6-7.
232. See infra note 233. 
233. See, e.g., Hutchinson v. Ecolab, Inc., No. 3:09cv1848(JBA), 2011 WL 
4542957, at *9-10 (D. Conn. Sept. 28, 2011) (finding triable issue on whether 
“medical leave of absence” was a reasonable accommodation); Coffman v. Robert J. 
Young Co., 871 F. Supp. 2d 703, 715 (M.D. Tenn. 2012) (finding triable issue on 
whether “additional unpaid leave” was a reasonable accommodation); Negron v. 
City of New York, No. 10 CV 2757(RRM)(LB), 2011 WL 4737068, at *12-14 
(E.D.N.Y. Sept. 14, 2011) (finding triable issue on whether “additional leave” was a 
reasonable accommodation); Kesecker v. Marin Cmty. Coll. Dist., No. C-11-4048 
JSC, 2012 WL 6738759, at *6-9 (N.D. Cal. Dec. 31, 2012) (finding triable issue on 
whether “finite leave of absence” was a reasonable accommodation); Martin v. 
Yokohama Tire Corp., Nos. 7:11-CV-00244, 7:11-CV-00467, 2013 WL 6002344, at 
*12-14 (W.D. Va. Nov. 12, 2013) (finding triable issue on whether “medical leave 
on a short-term basis” was a reasonable accommodation).
234. See supra note 233. 
235. EEOC v. UPS, Inc., No. 09 C 5291, 2014 WL 538577, at *1 (N.D. Ill. 
Feb. 11, 2014). 
236. Id. at *2. 
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Rather than arguing about the essential or non-essential nature of the 
function as many plaintiffs’ lawyers get trapped into doing, the 
EEOC rejected the employer’s characterization of the rule as a job 
function altogether.  
The EEOC argued that limiting medical leaves to a maximum 
of twelve months was actually a “qualification standard” that 
screened out individuals with disabilities without considering 
accommodations.237 Re-characterizing the rule as a qualification 
standard rather than a job function triggered the employer’s burden 
to prove the business necessity of its use, which is difficult to meet at 
a pretrial motion stage.238 The district court agreed with the EEOC.239
Although the court noted that regular attendance may sometimes be 
an essential job function, the court held that UPS’s twelve-month 
medical leave policy was a qualification standard—i.e., “a medical 
requirement that an individual must meet in order to maintain his or 
her position with UPS.”240 The court therefore denied the employer’s 
motion to dismiss.241
This small set of cases in which courts are engaging in a 
meaningful essential functions inquiry provides some optimism that 
the disqualification strategy has not yet become so successful as to 
preclude judicial re-education. These cases suggest that proactive 
litigants may be able to steer judges away from their mistaken 
assumptions about what counts as a job function and who gets to 
decide a function’s essential or nonessential nature. But if litigants 
assume that the ADAAA’s success in broadening the disability 
definition will automatically lead to analysis on the real issues of 
discriminatory intent, reasonable accommodations, and undue 
hardship, the concerning trends described above are likely to become 
entrenched in ADAAA case law. Courts’ early receptiveness to 
employers’ new disqualification strategy under the ADAAA should 
prompt plaintiffs’ attorneys to actively engage in the disqualification 
battle and educate courts on the correct interpretation and use of the 
                                                     
237. Id.
238. See Ryan v. City of Highland Heights, No. 1:93CV2593, 1995 WL 
584733, at *3 (N.D. Ohio July 19, 1995) (stating that “in the absence of evidence 
demonstrating conclusively that [an employer’s] test is job-related and consistent 
with business necessity,” the court must deny an employer’s summary judgment 
motion in a disability discrimination case challenging a job criteria). 
239. UPS, Inc., 2014 WL 538577, at *2. 
240. Id.
241. Id. at *3. 
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essential functions component of the qualified individual 
requirement.  
If plaintiffs’ attorneys can get courts to engage in a meaningful 
essential functions inquiry, that will help circumscribe its proper role 
to defining the boundary of an employer’s accommodation 
obligation in claims alleging an actual disability. It will not, 
however, address the more fundamental problem with the role that 
the essential functions concept is playing in claims brought under the 
ADA’s “regarded as” prong. Under the ADAAA’s new approach to 
the “regarded as” prong—which establishes a legal prohibition 
against impairment-based discrimination without a right to 
accommodation—the essential functions inquiry should play no role 
at all.242 Part III explains why the essential functions inquiry is 
incompatible with Congress’s intent to add impairment to the list of 
other protected statuses that are found in Title VII. 
III. UNDERMINING UNIVERSAL IMPAIRMENT-BASED 
ANTIDISCRIMINATION PROTECTION
Using the “qualified individual” requirement as a new ADA 
gatekeeper is particularly problematic in cases involving the 
“regarded as” prong, under which the “essential functions” concept 
should be irrelevant in post-ADAAA litigation. Section A explains 
why applying the “essential functions” concept to post-ADAAA 
“regarded as” claims adds an unwarranted hurdle to an employee’s 
prima facie case. Section B demonstrates how this hurdle misaligns 
the ADA’s “regarded as” prong from Title VII doctrine and thereby 
undermines Congress’s intent to create universal impairment-based 
antidiscrimination protection. Section B also reveals the pernicious 
effects of this subtle doctrinal move by embedding disability and 
impairment-based stereotypes into ADA doctrine and reinforcing the 
view that impairments diminish work ability unless proven 
otherwise, rather than endorsing the opposite assumption as is done 
with all other protected statuses.243
                                                     
242. See infra Section III.A. 
243. Cf. Knapp, supra note 77, at 717 (arguing that using the essential 
functions concept as a screening device would “reinforce the stereotypes . . . that 
people with disabilities are less worthy than are able-bodied individuals and thus 
should not be integrated into the world or seen as fully capable persons”).
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A. The Inappropriate Use of Essential Functions in “Regarded As” 
Claims 
While commentators rightfully applaud the ADAAA as having 
restored the protected class of individuals with disabilities to the 
broad scope that Congress originally intended,244 the ADAAA 
accomplished something even more profound. Through its 
amendments, Congress extricated “disability” from the broader 
concept of “impairment” and bestowed upon impairment the status 
of an independent protected class for purposes of conventional 
antidiscrimination law.245 This accomplishment is the result of two 
major components of the ADAAA. First, the ADAAA established 
that only individuals who fall under the statute’s “actual” or “record 
of” disability definitions are entitled to workplace 
accommodations.246 In other words, only individuals whose 
impairments are or have been substantially limiting of a major life 
activity—i.e., only individuals with disabilities—have the right to 
reasonable workplace accommodations. Second, the ADAAA 
dramatically expanded the definition of the “regarded as” prong to 
cover individuals with nearly all real or perceived physical or mental 
impairments, regardless of whether the impairment results in any 
functional limitations or stems from any disability-based stereotype 
or prejudice.247 As a result of these two changes, the “regarded as” 
prong is best understood as a source of nearly universal impairment-
based antidiscrimination protection, while the “actual” and “record 
of” prongs are best understood as establishing disability-based 
accommodation rights. 
In making this bifurcation, Congress intended to align the 
ADA’s “regarded as” prong with conventional antidiscrimination 
doctrine under Title VII.248 Just as Title VII prohibits employers from 
discriminating on the basis of race, color, religion, sex, or national 
origin, the ADA’s “regarded as” prong now prohibits employers 
from discriminating on the basis of real or perceived physical or 
mental impairments.249  
                                                     
244. See Travis, Impairment, supra note 9, at 938. 
245. See id. at 938, 943-55. 
246. See 42 U.S.C. § 12102(1) (2012).  
247. See supra note 23 (describing narrow exclusion of “transitory and 
minor” impairments).
248. See Travis, Impairment, supra note 9, at 949-55. 
249. See Kevin Barry, Toward Universalism: What the ADA Amendments 
Act of 2008 Can and Can’t Do for Disability Rights, 31 BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L.
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Unlike the ADA, Title VII has never had an “essential 
functions” component in its antidiscrimination doctrine. The reason 
that Congress added the “essential functions” concept to the ADA—
although the ADA’s language otherwise largely tracks Title VII’s 
language250—was because of the ADA’s reasonable accommodation 
mandate. In establishing the broad new right of individuals with 
disabilities to receive affirmative workplace modifications, Congress 
was also compelled to place limits on employers’ obligations. 
Congress limited the ADA’s accommodation mandate in three ways: 
(1) only requiring accommodations that are “reasonable”; (2) lifting 
the accommodation requirement when it imposes an “undue 
hardship” on an employer; and (3) using the “essential functions” 
concept to define which aspects of the workplace must be 
modified.251
With regard to the third limit, Congress established that 
employers are only required to modify the workplace in ways that 
enable employees to still perform a job’s “essential functions.” In 
other words, an employer may be required to accommodate an 
individual with a disability by eliminating a job’s marginal functions, 
but not by eliminating performance of an essential function of the 
job. At the same time, to prevent employers from invoking marginal 
job tasks to disqualify individuals with disabilities, the “essential 
functions” concept effectively defines the elimination of marginal 
                                                                                                               
203, 278 (2010) (arguing that the ADAAA’s expanded regarded as “prong 
harmonizes the concept of impairment with race, sex, and other protected 
characteristics”); Alex Long, State Anti-Discrimination Law as a Model for 
Amending the Americans with Disabilities Act, 65 U. PITT. L. REV. 597, 622 (2004) 
(describing “regarded as” plaintiffs as “virtually indistinguishable from plaintiffs 
who seek relief from discrimination under Title VII”); Jeannette Cox, Crossroads 
and Signposts: The ADA Amendments Act of 2008, 85 IND. L.J. 187, 189, 204 (2010) 
(“To a significant degree, the ADAAA may be read as aligning the ADA with Title 
VII.”).
250. See Cox, supra note 249, at 189-90 (explaining that “the ADA is 
patterned on Title VII” (citing 135 CONG. REC. 8,518 (1989) (statement of Sen. 
Lieberman)). 
251. See 42 U.S.C. § 12112(b)(5) (2012) (establishing obligation to provide 
“reasonable accommodations to . . . an otherwise qualified individual with a 
disability” unless it poses “an undue hardship”); id. § 12111(8) (defining a qualified 
individual as one “who, with or without reasonable accommodation, can perform the 
essential functions of the [job]”); id. § 12111(10) (defining undue hardship). Title 
VII contains a much more limited accommodation obligation for religion, see id.
§ 2000e(j), but its scope is limited by the Equal Protection Clause of the U.S. 
Constitution, which does not constrain the scope of the mandate under the ADA. See
Pamela S. Karlan & George Rutherglen, Disabilities, Discrimination, and 
Reasonable Accommodation, 46 DUKE L.J. 1, 5-8 (1996). 
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job tasks as a per se reasonable accommodation. In this way, the 
essential functions component of the ADA’s “qualified individual” 
requirement was intended to focus the accommodation inquiry on 
parts of the job that really matter. 
The “essential functions” concept is thus inextricably linked to 
and dependent upon the right to accommodations.252 Since the 
ADAAA severed the accommodation right from the “regarded as” 
prong, the “essential functions” concept has no appropriate role to 
play in assessing “regarded as” claims—just as the “essential 
functions” concept is absent from Title VII. Congress did not make 
this clear in the ADA’s amended language, however, which still 
contains a singular definition of a “qualified individual” as someone 
who can perform the essential job functions with or without 
accommodations.253 Although individuals alleging impairment-based 
discrimination under the “regarded as” prong are no longer eligible 
for accommodations, courts have mechanically continued to apply 
the same “qualified individual” requirement for claims under all 
three prongs.  
This is not to say that an employee’s qualifications and job 
performance are irrelevant to a “regarded as” claim. Rather, an 
employee’s qualifications and job performance should be assessed in 
the same way in ADA “regarded as” claims alleging impairment-
based discrimination as they are assessed in Title VII claims alleging 
discrimination on the basis of other protected statuses. Inserting the 
“essential functions” concept into an employee’s prima facie case in 
an ADA “regarded as” claim erects an unnecessary hurdle that does 
not exist for employees in Title VII discrimination claims. Section B 
reveals the significant impact that this is having on ADA “regarded 
as” claimants and how this is undermining Congress’s goal of 
establishing universal impairment-based antidiscrimination 
protection. 
B. How the Essential Functions Concept Undermines Universalism 
As explained above, one of Congress’s objectives with the 
ADAAA was to establish the “regarded as” prong as a source of 
impairment-based antidiscrimination protection that parallels Title 
VII’s antidiscrimination protection on the basis of race, color, 
                                                     
252. Cf. Porter, Backlash, supra note 25, at 69 (explaining that “the qualified 
inquiry is tied up with the reasonable accommodation inquiry”).
253. See 42 U.S.C. § 12111(8). 
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religion, sex, and national origin. Comparing the doctrinal approach 
that courts use to assess ADA “regarded as” claims with the 
approach used to assess Title VII claims at the pretrial motion stage 
provides a revealing picture about the extent to which that objective 
is being met. This comparison shows that incorporating the ADA’s 
“essential function” component from the accommodation analysis 
into “regarded as” claims is adding a significant hurdle where no 
similar hurdle exists under Title VII. As a result, employers’ new 
disqualification strategy is making it harder for plaintiffs to bring a 
claim of impairment discrimination than it is to bring a claim of 
discrimination on the basis of any other protected status. 
Revealing the role that the “essential functions” concept is 
playing in ratcheting up an employee’s burden in ADA “regarded as” 
cases does not require resolving the thorny questions about which 
doctrinal framework should apply when. Many scholars have 
analyzed the growing confusion in both Title VII and ADA cases 
regarding the appropriate use of the McDonald Douglas framework 
(which traditionally has been applied to single-motive cases) versus 
the mixed-motive framework.254 Courts in different jurisdictions use
varying approaches to decide which framework should apply.255 This 
confusion is compounded in ADA cases because of an additional 
jurisdictional split over which of three distinct versions of the mixed-
motive framework should apply to the ADA.256 Regardless of the 
                                                     
254. See, e.g., Nancy L. Zisk, What Is Old Is New Again: Understanding
Gross v. FBL Financial Services, Inc. and the Case Law that Has Saved Age 
Discrimination Law, 58 LOY. L. REV. 795, 805 (2012) (describing courts’ difficulty 
in deciding “whether a claim is a mixed-motives case or a single-motive, pretext 
case”); William R. Corbett, Unmasking a Pretext for Res Ipsa Loquitur: A Proposal 
to Let Employment Discrimination Speak for Itself, 62 AM. U. L. REV. 447, 490 
(2013) (observing “great uncertainty and confusion about the types of cases to which 
the McDonnell Douglas analysis applies”).
255. See David Sherwyn & Michael Heise, The Gross Beast of Burden of 
Proof: Experimental Evidence on How the Burden of Proof Influences Employment 
Discrimination Case Outcomes, 42 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 901, 916-19 (2010) (describing 
courts’ varied approaches on when to use the McDonnell Douglas or the mixed-
motive framework); Barrett S. Moore, Shifting the Burden: Genuine Disputes and 
Employment Discrimination Standards of Proof, 35 U. ARK. LITTLE ROCK L. REV.
113, 123-29 (2012) (same). 
256. Specifically, courts have split on whether ADA mixed-motive claims 
should use the “motivating factor” approach from the Civil Rights Act of 1991, the 
approach articulated in Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228 (1989), which 
applied to Title VII before the 1991 Act, or the approach in Gross v. FBL Financial 
Services, Inc., 557 U.S. 167 (2009), which adopted “but for” causation under the 
ADEA. See Widiss, supra note 26, at 912-13 (describing circuit court split on 
whether ADA recognizes mixed-motive claims and, if so, what framework applies); 
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framework or approach, however, the essential functions component 
of the “qualified individual” requirement in the prima facie case sets 
ADA “regarded as” claims apart from their Title VII analogues by 
raising the bar for getting an impairment discrimination claim past 
the motion stage. 
Although scholars have raised serious questions about the 
continued viability and value of the McDonnell Douglas burden-
shifting framework,257 federal district courts continue to invoke it 
frequently at the pretrial motion stage.258 Comparing how courts 
apply the McDonnell Douglas framework to Title VII claims versus 
ADA “regarded as” claims reveals a misalignment that 
disadvantages plaintiffs who allege impairment-based 
discrimination.259  
                                                                                                               
Sandra F. Sperino, Rethinking Discrimination Law, 110 MICH. L. REV. 69, 109 
(2011) (noting uncertainty “whether the ADA will follow a Title VII model, an 
ADEA model, or yet another model” for mixed-motive cases). 
257. Many commentators predicted the demise of the McDonnell Douglas
framework after Desert Palace, Inc. v. Costa, 539 U.S. 90 (2003), which held that 
direct evidence of discrimination is not needed to invoke a mixed-motive 
framework, id. at 92. See, e.g., William R. Corbett, Note, McDonnell Douglas, 
1973-2003: May You Rest in Peace?, 6 U. PA. J. LAB. & EMP. L. 199, 200, 212-14
(2003) (arguing that “the old McDonnell Douglas proof structure is as dead as a 
doornail”); Charles A. Sullivan, Disparate Impact: Looking Past the Desert Palace
Mirage, 47 WM. & MARY L. REV. 911, 935 (2005) (explaining that “McDonnell 
Douglas may be either doctrinally or functionally dead”). But see Christopher R. 
Hedican, Jason M. Hedican & Mark P.A. Hudson, McDonnell Douglas: Alive and 
Well, 52 DRAKE L. REV. 383, 395-402 (2004) (arguing that Desert Palace did not 
overrule McDonnell Douglas); Michael J. Zimmer, The New Discrimination Law:
Price Waterhouse is Dead, Whither McDonnell Douglas?, 53 EMORY L.J. 1887, 
1922-33 (2004) (analyzing the role for McDonnell Douglas after Desert Palace). 
Others have urged eliminating the McDonnell Douglas framework on various 
grounds. See, e.g., Corbett, supra note 254, at 450-51; Kenneth R. Davis, The 
Stumbling Three-Step Burden Shifting Approach in Employment Discrimination 
Cases, 61 BROOK. L. REV. 703, 761 (1995); Deborah C. Malamud, The Last Minuet: 
Disparate Treatment After Hicks, 93 MICH. L. REV. 2229, 2236 (1995); Sperino, 
supra note 256, at 115-24.
258. See Martin J. Katz, Reclaiming McDonnell Douglas, 83 NOTRE DAME 
L. REV. 109, 114-15, 120 (2007) [hereinafter Katz, Reclaiming] (stating that 
“McDonnell Douglas remains firmly entrenched in disparate treatment law”); 
Michael J. Zimmer, A Chain of Inferences Proving Discrimination, 79 U. COLO. L.
REV. 1243, 1281-82 (2008) (arguing that McDonnell Douglas “remain[s] a vibrant 
and useful way to prove discrimination”); Sherwyn & Heise, supra note 255, at 916 
(“Reports of McDonnell Douglas’s death . . . were greatly exaggerated.”); Corbett, 
supra note 254, at 505 (noting that McDonnell Douglas continues to “flourish[]”).
259. See Martin J. Katz, Gross Disunity, 114 PENN ST. L. REV. 857, 858 
(2010) (arguing that uniformity across federal antidiscrimination laws “is desirable, 
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In a Title VII case using the McDonnell Douglas framework to 
prove discrimination on the basis of race, color, religion, sex, or 
national origin, an employee first must prove a prima facie case, 
which requires four elements:  
(1) that she is a member of a protected class; (2) that she was qualified for 
the position sought; (3) she was subject to an adverse employment action; 
and (4) she was replaced by someone outside her protected class or was 
treated less favorably than other similarly situated employees outside her 
class.260  
If the employee proves a prima facie case, the burden of 
production shifts to the employer to articulate a legitimate 
nondiscriminatory reason (LNDR) for the adverse employment 
action.261 If the employer proffers an LNDR, the burden returns to the 
employee to persuade the fact-finder that the employer’s proffered 
reason is a pretext for discrimination on the basis of the employee’s 
protected status.262 Although the Supreme Court originally articulated 
this framework in the context of a hiring decision, courts have 
applied it to other adverse employment actions, including failure-to-
promote and discharge decisions.263
In Title VII cases, the overall prima facie case—and the 
“qualified” element in particular—were designed and are applied to 
                                                                                                               
both as a matter of efficient legal administration and as an assumption about 
Congressional intent”).
260. Haire v. Bd. of Supervisors of La. St. Univ. Agric. & Mech. Coll., 719 
F.3d 356, 363 (5th Cir. 2013). 
261. See id. at 362-63. Several scholars have criticized courts’ deference to 
employers’ asserted LNDRs in Title VII cases, just as this Article criticizes courts’ 
deference to employers’ asserted essential functions in ADA cases. See, e.g.,
Natasha T. Martin, Pretext in Peril, 75 MO. L. REV. 313, 324-25, 355 (2010) 
(arguing that courts have “an ethos of deference to an employer’s business
judgment” and “hesitate to pass judgment on the employer’s legitimate, non-
discriminatory reasons”); Sperino, supra note 256, at 111 (arguing that “courts have 
broadly defined what constitutes a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason” under Title 
VII and “largely defer to the business judgment of employers”). Employees in Title 
VII cases may at least challenge an LNDR as pretextual, however, while that 
opportunity is foreclosed to ADA plaintiffs if a court determines at the prima facie
stage that they are unable to perform an essential job function, which ends the case 
even if the employer has articulated an LNDR.
262. Haire, 719 F.3d at 362-63. 
263. See Sperino, supra note 256, at 76-77; see also Breaux v. City of 
Garland, 205 F.3d 150, 157 (5th Cir. 2000) (stating that the adverse action needed 
for a McDonnell Douglas prima facie case may include “discharges, demotions, 
refusals to hire, refusals to promote, and reprimands”).
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impose a very low burden on employees.264 There is no detailed 
assessment of job functions, tasks, or skills—essential or 
otherwise—at the prima facie stage. To meet the “qualified” element 
in a Title VII prima facie case, an employee need only show that he 
or she meets the job’s minimum, objectively measurable 
qualifications.265 Courts do not even require a plaintiff to meet a job 
qualification if the person who got the job also did not meet that 
criterion.266 Because the prima facie case focuses solely on 
“objectively verifiable” job requirements, an employee need not 
demonstrate that he or she has been or will be able to meet the 
employer’s subjective performance criteria.267 In a case involving 
discharge, an employee need not prove “perfect performance, or 
even average performance,” to meet the qualification element of a 
Title VII prima facie case.268 In a hiring or promotion case, an 
                                                     
264. See Katz, Reclaiming, supra note 258, at 124 n.63 (explaining that “the 
prima facie case is designed to set a fairly low threshold, which most plaintiffs are 
able to clear” (emphasis added)); Stephen W. Smith, Title VII’s National Anthem: Is 
There a Prima Facie Case for the Prima Facie Case?, 12 LAB. LAW. 371, 377 
(1997) (“The ‘burden’ of showing a prima facie case is commonly acknowledged to 
be extremely light.” (emphasis added)); Tex. Dep’t of Cmty. Affairs v. Burdine, 450 
U.S. 248, 253 (1981) (“The burden of establishing a prima facie case of disparate 
treatment is not onerous.” (emphasis added)). 
265. See Zimmer, supra note 258, at 1271 (describing the prima facie case as 
only requiring evidence that plaintiff has the “minimum qualifications necessary to 
perform the job[]”); Sherwyn & Heise, supra note 255, at 909 (describing the prima 
facie case as only requiring proof that plaintiff is “minimally qualified for the 
position”); Deborah M. Weiss, The Impossibility of Agnostic Discrimination Law,
2011 UTAH L. REV. 1677, 1725 (describing the prima facie case as only requiring 
proof that plaintiff “met the minimum qualifications”).
266. See Michael J. Hayes, That Pernicious Pop-Up, the Prima Facie Case,
39 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 343, 366-67 (2006) (describing cases in which Title VII 
plaintiffs need not meet a qualification when the person selected also lacked the 
qualification); Johnson v. Louisiana, 351 F.3d 616, 623-25 (5th Cir. 2003) (holding 
that Title VII plaintiffs need not prove they meet a job’s stated qualification if the 
person hired also lacked the qualification); Carter v. Three Springs Residential 
Treatment, 132 F.3d 635, 637, 643 (11th Cir. 1998) (reversing dismissal because 
plaintiff was improperly required to prove a qualification that the person hired for 
the job also lacked). 
267. See Vessels v. Atlanta Indep. Sch. Sys., 408 F.3d 763, 768-69 (11th Cir. 
2005) (holding in Title VII cases that “subjective evaluations play no part in the 
plaintiff’s prima facie case” (emphasis added)); Nicholson v. Hyannis Air Serv., 
Inc., 580 F.3d 1116, 1123 (9th Cir. 2009) (finding district court improperly 
considered subjective qualifications in plaintiff’s prima facie Title VII case); Kulik 
v. Med. Imaging Res., Inc., 325 F. App’x 413, 414 (6th Cir. 2009) (same).
268. See 45B AM. JUR. 2D Job Discrimination § 938 (2012) (compiling Title 
VII cases showing that “the plaintiff need not show perfect performance, or even 
average performance,” to state a prima facie case). 
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employee need not prove that he or she “is a strong or even plausible 
candidate” for the position being sought,269 nor does the employee 
typically have to prove that he or she is more qualified than the 
individual who received the position.270 If anything, the trend has 
been toward lowering the bar on the “qualified” element of a Title 
VII prima facie case, as courts have been “watering down” the 
requirement in recognition that performance criteria for many 
positions, particularly high level positions, are becoming less 
objectively measurable.271 As a result, Title VII claims are rarely 
dismissed for an employee’s failure to state a prima facie case, 
particularly for failure to establish the “qualified” element.272
The qualified element of a Title VII prima facie case is not 
only a low hurdle when it is applied, but in most cases it is irrelevant 
to a judge’s assessment of a summary judgment motion.273 The 
Supreme Court has clarified that once an employer has articulated an 
LNDR for the adverse action in a Title VII disparate treatment claim, 
                                                     
269. See David N. Rosen & Jonathan M. Freiman, Remodeling McDonnell 
Douglas: Fisher v. Vassar College and the Structure of Employment Discrimination 
Law, 17 Q.L.R. 725, 752-53 (1998) (reviewing Title VII case law showing that “a 
plaintiff need make only a ‘minimal showing of qualification,’ and need not show 
that she is a strong or even plausible candidate” to state a prima facie case (citation 
omitted)). 
270. See 45B AM. JUR. 2D Job Discrimination § 938 (2012) (compiling Title 
VII cases showing that “[t]he employee’s performance . . . does not have to be 
compared with that of other employees” to state a prima facie case); Charlotte N. 
Sweeney, Employment Law Survey, 71 DENV. U. L. REV. 945, 951-53 (1994) 
(analyzing Title VII case law showing that a plaintiff’s “relative qualifications” to 
the person selected “are best addressed at the pretext stage”); Rosen & Freiman, 
supra note 269, at 753 (explaining that a plaintiff does not need “to demonstrate that 
she was as fully qualified as the candidates selected for a noncompetitive position, 
or more qualified than those selected for a competitive position” to state a Title VII 
prima facie case). 
271. See Rosen & Freiman, supra note 269, at 748-49, 752-53; Alisa D. 
Shudofsky, Relative Qualifications and the Prima Facie Case in Title VII Litigation,
82 COLUM. L. REV. 553, 559 (1982) (noting courts’ tendency to “reject[] arguments 
seeking to increase plaintiffs’ prima facie burden” on the qualification element in 
Title VII cases (emphasis added)). 
272. See Denny Chin & Jodi Golinsky, Moving Beyond McDonnell Douglas:
A Simplified Method for Assessing Evidence in Discrimination Cases, 64 BROOK. L.
REV. 659, 668 (1998) (explaining that Title VII’s “prima facie case has evolved into 
something of a formality,” and “many courts simply presume” that it is met).
273. See Brady v. Office of the Sergeant at Arms, 520 F.3d 490, 492 (D.C. 
Cir. 2008) (“[W]hether the plaintiff in a [Title VII] disparate-treatment 
discrimination suit actually made out a prima facie case is almost always irrelevant 
when the district court considers an employer’s motion for summary
judgment . . . .”).
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the question of whether the employee stated a prima facie case is “no 
longer relevant” and “drops out of the picture.”274 As one circuit 
court has explained, although “[m]uch ink has been spilled regarding 
the proper contours of the prima-facie-case aspect of McDonnell 
Douglas[,] . . . the prima facie case is a largely unnecessary 
sideshow.”275 Whenever an employer has asserted an LNDR—which 
occurs in nearly all claims that make it to summary judgment—the 
focus is entirely upon whether the employee has produced enough 
evidence for a fact-finder to find the LNDR pretextual for 
discrimination on the basis of race, color, religion, sex, or national 
origin.276
This does not mean that an employee’s actual performance or 
ability to perform various job functions is irrelevant in Title VII 
cases; it just means that analysis of relevant qualification issues is
housed in the pretext stage.277 Assessing qualifications in the pretext 
rather than the prima facie stage has several important consequences. 
First, if an employee’s ability to perform a particular job function 
was not raised as an LNDR, then no analysis is conducted about 
whether the employee can or cannot perform that function (or 
whether that function is or is not essential). An employee has no 
burden to establish the ability to perform job functions that the 
                                                     
274. St. Mary’s Honor Ctr. v. Hicks, 509 U.S. 502, 510-11 (1993); Reeves v. 
Sanderson Plumbing Prods., Inc., 530 U.S. 133, 143 (2000); U.S. Postal Serv. Bd. of 
Governors v. Aikens, 460 U.S. 711, 715 (1983) (“Where the defendant has done 
everything that would be required of him if the plaintiff had properly made out a 
prima facie case, whether the plaintiff really did so is no longer relevant.”); Brady,
520 F.3d at 494 (“In a Title VII disparate-treatment suit where an employee has 
suffered an adverse employment action and an employer has asserted a legitimate, 
non-discriminatory reason for the decision, the district court need not—and should 
not—decide whether the plaintiff actually made out a prima facie case under 
McDonnell Douglas.”).
275. Brady, 520 F.3d at 494 (emphasis added). 
276. See id. (citing Hicks, 509 U.S. at 507-08; Aikens, 460 U.S. at 714-16); 
Katz, Reclaiming, supra note 258, at 135 n.91 (arguing that “courts should never 
dismiss cases for failure to state a prima facie case where the defendant nonetheless 
proffers a reason for its action and the plaintiff has evidence tending to show that the 
proffered reason is pretext”).
277. See Rosen & Freiman, supra note 269, at 752-54 (stating that “real 
analysis and evaluation of evidence” of a plaintiff’s qualifications is “reserved for 
the [pretext] stage” of Title VII cases); see also Russell G. Donaldson, Annotation,
Consideration of Work Performance or Production Records as Pretext for Unlawful 
Employment Practice Violative of Title VII of Civil Rights Act of 1964 (42 USCS 
§§ 2000e et seq.), 32 A.L.R. Fed. 7, § 2[a] (1977) (stating that employee 
performance issues should be raised by the employer as an LNDR and analyzed in 
the pretext stage). 
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employer does not assert as an LNDR for the adverse employment 
action.  
Second, if an employee’s ability to perform a particular job 
function is raised as an LNDR, there is no deference given to an 
employer’s statement as to whether that job function is essential, 
which is a concept foreign to Title VII analysis. The focus in 
assessing pretext is on what role, if any, either the employer’s stated 
LNDR or the employee’s protected status played in the adverse 
employment decision. When an employer does raise an employee’s 
qualifications or ability to perform aspects of the job as an LNDR, 
the employee is then able to submit all evidence relevant to the 
accuracy, legitimacy, and motives underlying the asserted LNDR as 
part of the pretext analysis. As long as the employee can raise a 
genuine issue regarding pretext, the Title VII case will proceed past 
summary judgment. 
Housing the analysis of job qualification issues in the pretext 
rather than the prima facie stage of a Title VII case ensures that only 
qualification issues that may relate to the adverse employment action 
are considered at summary judgment, and it allows full assessment of 
all contextual facts regarding the qualifications criteria. The 
employee may challenge the asserted qualification or performance 
issues as untrue, inaccurate, or not causally linked to the adverse 
action.278 The employee may show that the employer adopted the 
qualification criteria with a discriminatory motive or applied it in a 
discriminatory manner to members of the employee’s class.279 The 
employee may also show that his or her job performance record was 
itself the result of bias by showing discriminatory manipulation of 
job assignments, failure to provide protected class members with 
adequate training, or simply from conscious or unconscious 
stereotypes by the evaluating superiors, particularly when being 
assessed on subjective criteria.280 As a result, the qualification 
element of a Title VII prima facie case typically gets “subsumed into 
                                                     
278. See Donaldson, supra note 277, §§ 2[a], 7. 
279. See id. §§ 2[a], 6; see also 45B AM. JUR. 2D Job Discrimination § 938 
(2012); Henry L. Chambers, Jr., Getting It Right: Uncertainty and Error in the New 
Disparate Treatment Paradigm, 60 ALB. L. REV. 1, 17 (1996) (“[I]f a prima facie 
case suggests that a minority employee is not qualified for a promotion, but the 
majority race employee who received the promotion was even less qualified, 
intentional discrimination could be inferred . . . .”).
280. See Donaldson, supra note 277, §§ 2-5.
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one of establishing that the employer’s alleged nondiscriminatory 
reason . . . was pretextual.”281
This picture is quite different when courts analyze an ADA 
“regarded as” claim alleging impairment-based discrimination at a 
pretrial motion stage. Courts generally articulate the prima facie case 
with elements that closely mirror those in the standard McDonnell 
Douglas formulation, except that they replace the general “qualified 
element” with the ADA’s more specific definition of a “qualified 
individual.”282 Rather than using the typical “qualified for the 
position” language in the McDonnell Douglas framework, courts use 
the definition of a “qualified individual with a disability” who must 
be able to “perform the essential functions of the job with or without 
reasonable accommodation.”283 Courts acknowledge that the 
ADAAA severed the accommodation right from the “regarded as” 
prong, but rather than concluding that the essential functions concept 
is therefore irrelevant, courts instead conclude that the employee 
must prove his or her ability to perform all essential job functions 
without accommodations in order to state a prima facie case of 
impairment-based discrimination.284 This subtle move generally goes 
                                                     
281. See 45B AM. JUR. 2D Job Discrimination § 938 (2012). 
282. See, e.g., Wurzel v. Whirlpool Corp., 482 F. App’x 1, 9 (6th Cir. 2012) 
(describing a prima facie case under the ADAAA’s “regarded as” prong); 
Kiniropoulos v. Northampton Cty. Child Welfare Serv., 917 F. Supp. 2d 377, 383-
84 (E.D. Pa. 2013) (same); see also Azzam v. Baptist Healthcare Affiliates, Inc., 855 
F. Supp. 2d 653, 658 (W.D. Ky. 2012) (listing elements of a prima facie ADA case); 
Fleck v. Wilmac Corp., No. 10-05562, 2012 WL 1033472, at *5-6 (E.D. Pa. Mar. 
27, 2012) (applying McDonnell Douglas to an ADAAA claim). 
283. See, e.g., EEOC v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 477 F.3d 561, 568 (8th Cir. 
2007) (applying McDonnell Douglas to ADA claims lacking direct evidence, but 
replacing general qualification element with specific requirement that plaintiff be 
“qualified to perform the essential functions of his position, with or without a 
reasonable accommodation” (citation omitted)); Jones v. Nationwide Life Ins. Co., 
696 F.3d 78, 86-87 (1st Cir. 2012) (same); Olsen v. Capital Region Med. Ctr., 713 
F.3d 1149, 1153-54 (8th Cir. 2013) (same). 
284. See, e.g., Wurzel, 482 F. App’x at 11 & n.13 (explaining that because an 
ADAAA “regarded as” plaintiff “would not be entitled to the benefit of a reasonable 
accommodation[,] . . . the question of [the employee’s] qualification must be 
decided without regard to any potential accommodation”); Jennings v. Dow Corning 
Corp., No. 12-12227, 2013 WL 1962333, at *1, *9 (E.D. Mich. May 10, 2013) 
(holding that an ADAAA “regarded as” plaintiff must prove the ability to perform 
the essential job functions without accommodation); Hoback v. City of Chattanooga, 
No. 1:10-CV-74, 2012 WL 3834828, at *4-5 (E.D. Tenn. Sept. 4, 2012) (holding 
that an ADAAA plaintiff “who is only ‘regarded as’ disabled must be able to
perform the essential functions of the job without reasonable accommodation” to 
“show he is a qualified individual”). Courts that had not applied the accommodation 
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unchallenged because it appears to be a rational, statute-specific 
application of McDonnell Douglas to the disability context. 
However, significant consequences flow from this maneuver, which 
ultimately makes stating an impairment discrimination claim more 
difficult than stating a claim for discrimination on the basis of race, 
sex, or Title VII’s other protected statuses.
Inserting the essential functions requirement into the 
qualification element of a prima facie ADA “regarded as” claim 
would not be particularly problematic if courts treated the prima 
facie case as irrelevant whenever an employer proffers an LNDR, as 
courts do with Title VII claims. Unfortunately, most courts do not 
allow the prima facie case to “drop out of the picture” when an 
employer asserts an LNDR in an ADA “regarded as” case, but 
instead treat the “qualified individual” requirement as an enduring 
threshold hurdle that an employee must overcome before the court 
will assess any asserted LNDRs for pretext.285 Thus, unlike in Title 
VII claims where the prima facie case is almost always irrelevant at 
the summary judgment stage where employers routinely assert one or 
more LNDRs, the prima facie case becomes the central focus of 
many ADA “regarded as” claims. More specifically, the central 
focus often becomes the employee’s ability to perform all essential 
job functions, whether or not the employer asserted the employee’s 
inability to perform any such function as an LNDR for the adverse 
employment action in the case.286
That also would not be particularly problematic if courts 
treated the “qualified individual” requirement in a prima facie ADA 
“regarded as” claim as the same minimal hurdle that they do in a 
Title VII prima facie case. Unfortunately, as described above, courts 
often treat the “qualified individual” requirement as a very high 
hurdle. Moreover, by deferring to an employer’s definition of a job’s 
                                                                                                               
mandate to “regarded as” claims under pre-ADAAA law had used the same 
approach to the qualified element. See, e.g., Balliett v. Heydt, Nos. Civ.A. 95-5184, 
Civ.A. 95-7182, 1997 WL 611609, at *6 (E.D. Pa. Sept. 25, 1997) (explaining that 
an ADA “regarded as” plaintiff “must still identify all of the essential job functions, 
but is required to produce evidence that he is capable of performing all such duties 
without accommodation”).
285. EEOC v. Amego, Inc., 110 F.3d 135, 145 (1st Cir. 1997) (stating that in 
ADA claims, “showing ‘qualifications’ has substance, notwithstanding the frequent 
leapfrogging of that analysis to get to the pretext issue under McDonnell Douglas”).
286. See, e.g., Jennings, 2013 WL 1962333, at *1, *9-12 (extensively 
analyzing the “qualified individual” requirement and dismissing ADAAA “regarded 
as” claim because plaintiff was unable to perform all essential functions of a “Loss 
Prevention Officer” job).
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essential functions—which employers have diligently been 
enshrining in new and expansive job descriptions—courts allow the 
height of this hurdle to be controlled to a very large degree by 
employers themselves. Unlike in Title VII cases where an employee 
need only show minimal, objective qualifications to meet the prima 
facie case, an ADA “regarded as” plaintiff must show the ability to 
perform every function that an employer deems to be essential to the 
job. This creates some striking differences in the content of the 
prima facie case analysis under Title VII and the ADA’s “regarded 
as” prong. 
Subjective qualifications offer one illustration of this 
difference. While courts deem subjective assessments irrelevant to a 
Title VII prima facie case,287 employers may assert subjective 
qualifications as essential job functions that an employee must meet 
to state a prima facie ADA “regarded as” claim. In a Title VII case, 
an employer must assert purported issues with an employee’s 
“attitude,” “interpersonal skills,” “personality,” or “relations with 
coemployees” as an LNDR to explain the adverse employment 
action.288 The employee may then challenge whether those subjective 
job requirements played a role in the adverse action, or whether the 
plaintiff’s protected status played a role in the selection, evaluation,
or application of those subjective job requirements.289 In an ADA 
“regarded as” claim, in contrast, an employer may assert a wide 
range of subjective attitude, personality, or interpersonal qualities as 
essential job functions,290 which then requires the employee to 
demonstrate the ability to perform those functions to state a prima 
facie case, regardless of whether the alleged inability played a role in 
the adverse employment action or whether the criteria were adopted 
                                                     
287. See supra note 267 and accompanying text. 
288. See 45B AM. JUR. 2D Job Discrimination § 948 (2012) (compiling Title 
VII cases). 
289. See Vessels v. Atlanta Indep. Sch. Sys., 408 F.3d 763, 769 (11th Cir. 
2005) (holding that “subjective evaluations . . . are properly articulated as part of the 
employer’s burden to produce [an LNDR] . . . then subsequently evaluated as part of 
the court’s pretext inquiry”).
290. See Who Is Qualified Individual, supra note 81, §§ 2[a], 40-41 
(summarizing pre-ADAAA cases showing that mere employer expectations, such as 
the “acceptance of supervision” and “the ability to get along with others,” have been 
deemed essential functions of all or most jobs); see also Kinghorn v. Gen. Hosp. 
Corp., No. 11-12078-DPW, 2014 WL 3058291, at *6, *9 (D. Mass. July 1, 2014) 
(relying on the employer’s job description to conclude that “strong communication 
skills” and “the ability to ‘work independently on projects with limited supervision’” 
and to “[w]ork collaboratively” were essential functions of a Bioinformatics 
Specialist position). 
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or applied in a discriminatory manner. The gap between the 
treatment of subjective qualifications in a Title VII claim versus an 
ADA “regarded as” claim is even wider in many jurisdictions where 
courts are reluctant to permit employers to raise subjective reasons as 
an LNDR at all in Title VII cases, or where courts at least subject 
them to heightened scrutiny.291
The Eleventh Circuit explained the risks from allowing 
evaluations of subjective qualifications to play a role in the prima 
facie case when it prohibited such an approach under Title VII.292 “If 
we were to hold an employer’s subjective evaluations sufficient to 
defeat the prima facie case,” the court explained, “plaintiff would be 
given no opportunity to demonstrate that the subjective evaluation 
was pretextual.”293 The court recognized that “[s]uch a blind 
acceptance of subjective evaluations” would seriously undermine 
antidiscrimination law because “subjective criteria can be a ready 
vehicle for race-based decisions.”294
The same rationale should be compelling in the disability 
context, as social scientists have documented that implicit biases 
related to disability are particularly robust and widespread.295 Implicit 
disability-based bias is not only shared “across genders, ethnicities, 
age groups, and political orientations,”296 but is also stronger than 
                                                     
291. See Katz, Reclaiming, supra note 258, at 172 (explaining that some 
courts prohibit employers from invoking subjective reasons, “such as ‘personality 
conflicts,’” as LNDRs because they “are difficult to disprove” and “[t]he point of 
McDonnell Douglas is to require employers to provide a reason that can be tested”); 
Aka v. Wash. Hosp. Ctr., 156 F.3d 1284, 1298 (D.C. Cir. 1998) (stating that courts 
“treat explanations that rely heavily on subjective considerations with caution”); 
Lawrence D. Rosenthal, Motions for Summary Judgment When Employers Offer 
Multiple Justifications for Adverse Employment Actions: Why the Exceptions Should 
Swallow the Rule, 2002 UTAH L. REV. 335, 370-71 (explaining that some courts 
apply heightened scrutiny when employers articulate subjective reasons as LNDRs); 
Melissa Hart, Subjective Decisionmaking and Unconscious Discrimination, 56 ALA.
L. REV. 741, 767 (2005) (arguing that courts are rightfully suspicious when 
employers articulate subjective reasons as LNDRs). 
292. See Vessels, 408 F.3d at 768-69. 
293. See id. (emphasis added). 
294. Id. at 769. 
295. See Dale Larson, Comment, Unconsciously Regarded as Disabled: 
Implicit Bias and the Regarded-As Prong of the Americans with Disabilities Act, 56 
UCLA L. REV. 451, 475-78 (2008) (summarizing social science research 
documenting implicit disability-based biases). 
296. See Brian A. Nosek et al., Pervasiveness and Correlates of Implicit 
Attitudes and Stereotypes, 18 EUROPEAN REV. SOC. PSYCHOL. 36, 40, 54-55 (2007) 
(aggregating 2.5 million responses to the Implicit Association Test). Implicit 
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implicit biases based on gender, race, religion, and sexuality.297
Disability bias is also particularly difficult to disrupt because implicit 
and explicit attitudes about disability are more weakly correlated 
than for most other protected statuses,298 which means that “people 
are particularly unwilling to admit—or more likely, are unaware 
of—their implicit bias against individuals with disabilities.”299 By 
allowing employers to assert subjective qualifications as essential job 
functions, courts are allowing these disability biases to go 
unscrutinized by enabling employers to obtain dismissals of ADA 
cases at the prima facie stage—exactly the concern that lead the 
Eleventh Circuit and other courts to reject such an approach under 
Title VII. 
Another example of the difference between the prima facie
case for Title VII versus ADA “regarded as” claims involves 
structural workplace norms. As explained above, courts have 
allowed employers to assert structural norms as essential job 
functions, for which an employee must demonstrate compliance to 
state a prima facie ADA claim. In Title VII cases, in contrast, 
employers must raise issues of absenteeism, attendance, or tardiness 
as LNDRs for the adverse employment action, which then permits 
the employee to challenge the credibility and application of those 
structural norms in the pretext stage.300 For example, a Title VII 
plaintiff could show in the pretext analysis that a similarly situated 
employee outside the plaintiff’s protected class was not fired for the 
same attendance record.301 In an ADA case, in contrast, once a court 
deems regular attendance to be an “essential function”—often 
largely if not entirely because the employer’s job description 
declares it so—the employee is deemed unqualified, and the court 
                                                                                                               
disability-based bias even exists among individuals with disabilities, although to a 
lesser degree than for the nondisabled. Id. at 54-55. 
297. See id. Implicit bias is also stronger for disability than for political 
orientation. Id. Only age-based bias appeared stronger than disability-based bias. Id.
298. See id. (finding a weaker correlation between implicit and explicit 
attitudes about disability than for other protected statuses except age); see also
Steven R. Pruett & Fong Chan, The Development and Psychometric Validation of 
the Disability Attitude Implicit Association Test, 51 REHABILITATION PSYCHOL. 202, 
207 (2006) (finding no significant correlation between implicit and explicit 
disability bias in a study of 223 subjects). 
299. See Larson, supra note 295, at 477. 
300. See 45B AM. JUR. 2D Job Discrimination § 950 (2012) (compiling Title 
VII cases). 
301. See id.  
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typically does not proceed to analyzing the potential pretextual 
nature of the attendance requirement.  
As these examples illustrate, courts’ refusal to allow the 
“qualified individual” requirement to drop out of the case when an 
employer proffers an LNDR, along with courts’ deference to 
employers’ asserted essential job functions, means that ADA 
“regarded as” plaintiffs may never receive meaningful assessment of 
whether impairment discrimination played a role in an adverse 
employment action. Some employers have won on summary 
judgment based on a finding that the employee was unable to 
perform an asserted essential function and was therefore unqualified, 
without the court ever considering evidence that the inability was not 
the real motive for the adverse action or that the employer adopted or 
applied the criteria in a discriminatory manner.302 Some employers 
have even won on summary judgment based on a finding that the 
employee was unable to perform an asserted essential function and 
was therefore unqualified when the employer did not even assert that 
the alleged inability motivated the adverse action at issue.303
The district court decision in Azzam v. Baptist Healthcare 
Affiliates, Inc. illustrates the heightened role that the qualified 
element of the prima facie case is playing in ADA “regarded as” 
claims.304 Azzam was a registered nurse (RN) who suffered a stroke 
                                                     
302. See supra notes 288-301; infra notes 304-05. A few district courts have 
approached ADA “regarded as” claims correctly by analyzing alleged performance 
issues not under the qualifications element of the prima facie case but as an asserted 
LNDR that is scrutinized for pretext, just as McDonnell Douglas works in Title VII 
cases. See, e.g., Cohen v. CHLN, Inc., No. 10-00514, 2011 WL 2713737, at *6-9
(E.D. Pa. July 13, 2011) (finding triable issue in ADA “regarded as” claim as to 
whether discharge was based on performance or on employee’s impairment); 
Meinelt v. P.F. Chang’s China Bistro, Inc., 787 F. Supp. 2d 643, 645-47, 651-53 
(S.D. Tex. 2011) (same). In those cases, the employee had been performing 
satisfactorily, informed the employer of an impairment, and was promptly fired for 
alleged performance issues that appeared contrived. See Cohen, 2011 WL 2713737, 
at *9; Meinelt, 787 F. Supp. 2d at 646. 
303. See infra notes 304-22 and accompanying text. 
304. 855 F. Supp. 2d 653 (W.D. Ky. 2012). In some cases, courts improperly 
treated the “essential functions” component of the qualifications element of the 
prima facie case as a high and non-disappearing hurdle, but the employee 
nevertheless created a triable issue on his or her qualifications. See, e.g.,
Chamberlain v. Valley Health Sys., Inc., 781 F. Supp. 2d 305, 310-11 (W.D. Va. 
2011) (finding triable issue in ADAAA “regarded as” claim as to whether plaintiff 
with a visual impairment could perform the essential functions of a pharmacy 
technician); Gaus v. Norfolk S. Ry. Co., No. 09-1698, 2011 WL 4527359, at *20-29
(W.D. Pa. Sept. 28, 2011) (finding triable issue in ADAAA “regarded as” claim as 
1752 Michigan State Law Review  2015:1689 
or cardiovascular incident.305 Pursuant to her doctor’s direction, she 
returned to work on light duty and was then allowed to work for four 
months on a five-hour per day schedule without “on-call” 
responsibilities on evenings or weekends.306 After co-workers 
complained about Azzam not taking on-call time, the employer 
demanded that she return to eight-hour days and take on-call 
responsibilities.307 Azzam said that she was not medically cleared for 
longer shifts or on-call hours, so her employer fired her.308 Azzam 
brought an ADA “regarded as” claim, and the employer sought 
summary judgment.309 The court held that although Azzam had 
created a triable issue on her protected status under the ADAAA’s 
“broadened standards,” she failed to show that she could perform the 
essential functions of an RN job.310 The court therefore granted the 
employer summary judgment on the ground that the employee had 
failed to prove the “qualified individual” element of her prima facie
case.311
In reaching that conclusion, the court accepted the employer’s 
assertion that working eight-hour shifts and taking on-call time were 
essential functions of a surgical RN job, in large part because a 
personnel policy listed on-call responsibilities as a requirement and 
the job description listed “adhering to departmental policies . . . as a 
principal duty” of a surgical RN.312 Because the court concluded that 
the employee was unqualified and therefore failed to state her prima 
facie case, the court did not address whether the employer had 
proffered an LNDR for her discharge or whether the employee had 
created a triable issue that the LNDR was a pretext for impairment 
discrimination. 
Unlike in a Title VII case, the Azzam court analyzed the 
qualification element of the ADA prima facie case at length and used 
it to dismiss the employee’s claim, even though the employer had 
proffered two LNDRs for the discharge. The employer’s written 
“Separation Report” stated that the reasons for Azzam’s termination 
                                                                                                               
to whether plaintiff with a “chronic pain condition” could perform the essential 
functions of an electrician). 
305. Azzam, 855 F. Supp. 2d at 655. 
306. Id. at 656. 
307. Id. at 655-56. 
308. Id. at 656. 
309. Id. at 657. 
310. Id. at 661-62. 
311. Id. at 655, 662. 
312. Id. at 661. 
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were her being “[d]issatisfied w[ith] [s]chedule” and being “unable 
to take call which is a requirement for staff RN’s in surgery.”313 In a 
Title VII case, those articulated LNDRs would have rendered the 
prima facie case irrelevant and shifted analysis exclusively to 
pretext. The Azzam court, in contrast, never analyzed pretext because 
it granted summary judgment based on the employee’s failure to 
state a prima facie case. As a result, the court never discussed 
potential inferences that a jury might draw about a discriminatory 
motive from the fact that Azzam successfully performed as a surgical 
RN on her reduced-hour schedule for four months without any 
negative feedback, and the employer only demanded the hour change 
and on-call responsibilities after other RNs complained.314 One of the 
employer’s asserted essential functions—the purported need to work 
eight-hour shifts—was not even stated in the Separation Report as a 
reason for her termination or as a requirement for an RN position, yet 
the employer nonetheless was permitted to raise the employee’s 
inability to meet that requirement as a basis for disqualifying her 
from ADA coverage.  
This latter issue is illustrated even more strikingly in the district 
court case of Kiniropoulos v. Northampton County Child Welfare 
Service.315 The plaintiff was a child welfare services caseworker who 
had received “satisfactory or commendable” performance 
evaluations.316 The plaintiff injured his leg, which affected his 
mobility and made it difficult for him to attend hearings, so he asked 
his employer for a temporary medical leave.317 His employer never 
responded to the request, but instead promptly informed the plaintiff 
that it had discovered “an issue with the [p]laintiff[‘s] work 
documentation . . . [and] several alleged infractions and alleged 
misconduct regarding the [p]laintiff’s cases,” for which the plaintiff 
was suspended and then fired.318
The employee filed a complaint alleging an ADA “regarded as” 
claim, and the employer filed a motion to dismiss.319 The court held 
that the employee’s allegations supported protected class status, 
which is just as Congress intended under the ADAAA.320 But the 
                                                     
313. Id. at 657. 
314. See id. at 655-56.  
315. 917 F. Supp. 2d 377 (E.D. Pa. 2013). 
316. Id. at 381. 
317. Id. at 381-82. 
318. Id. at 382. 
319. Id. at 382-83. 
320. See id. at 386-87. 
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court also held that the employee had not sufficiently pled the 
“qualified individual” element of his prima facie case.321 The court 
concluded that because the employee had asked for leave, “he could 
not perform the essential functions of the job as he could not perform 
any job functions and he is not a qualified individual under the 
act.”322 This was despite the fact that the employer had not claimed to 
have suspended and fired the plaintiff for requesting or needing a 
temporary leave, but rather for alleged issues with his work 
documentation and case misconduct.323 The employee never had an 
opportunity to litigate whether those asserted LNDRs were the real 
reason for him losing his job, although the timing of his termination 
suggests that the LNDRs may have been a pretext for impairment 
discrimination. The “qualified individual” requirement not only 
remained in the case even though the employer had stated an LNDR, 
but it secured the employer a dismissal even though the basis for 
disqualification was not the reason the employer gave for the 
employee’s termination. 
The plaintiff also brought a Title VII national origin 
discrimination claim in the same complaint based on the same 
factual allegations, which the employer also moved to dismiss.324 The 
court began by reciting the standard elements of a prima facie case 
under the McDonnell Douglas framework, including that the plaintiff 
must be “qualified for the position.”325 Although the court’s opinion 
had just analyzed the ADA “regarded as” claim and dismissed it for 
failure to plead the “qualified individual” requirement of the prima 
facie case, the court did not analyze the “qualified” element in the 
Title VII prima facie case at all, other than noting in passing that the 
plaintiff had alleged “he was qualified for the position he held.”326
The court ultimately dismissed the national origin claim as well, but 
it did so on the fourth element because the plaintiff had failed to 
plead any facts in the complaint alleging “that the action occurred 
under circumstances that give rise to an inference of unlawful 
discrimination.”327
In cases like Kiniropoulus, in which an employer obtains a 
dismissal of an ADA “regarded as” claim on the ground that the 
                                                     
321. See id. at 387. 
322. Id.
323. See id. at 382. 
324. Id. at 381, 388.  
325. Id. at 388. 
326. Id. at 389.  
327. Id. at 388-90. 
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employee is unqualified even though the employer did not assert the 
qualification issue as the reason for the adverse employment action, 
the prima facie case is playing a very different role than it does in 
Title VII claims. In Title VII cases, the prima facie case is designed 
simply to compel the employer to produce a reason for its adverse 
action.328 That reason, in turn, gives the employee a target when 
trying to make the often difficult circumstantial showing that a 
discriminatory motive played a role in the decision.329 That is why 
the prima facie case drops out once an employer proffers an LNDR 
to explain its decision. In an ADA “regarded as” case, in contrast, an 
employee may be required to prove the ability to perform all job 
functions that the employer deems essential as a threshold to having 
his or her discrimination claim considered, even if the employer has 
asserted a reason other than the alleged inability to perform a job 
function as the basis for the adverse employment action.  
                                                     
328. See Hayes, supra note 266, at 375 (explaining that the prima facie case 
exists “to force the employer to produce a reason for its action”); Michael J. 
Zimmer, Chaos or Coherence: Individual Disparate Treatment Discrimination and 
the ADEA, 51 MERCER L. REV. 693, 706 (2000) (explaining that McDonnell Douglas
“creat[es] a rebuttable presumption of liability to force the employer to come 
forward with the nondiscriminatory reason it claims justified its decision”); Henry L. 
Chambers, Jr., Discrimination, Plain and Simple, 36 TULSA L.J. 557, 561 (2001) 
(describing the prima facie case as “merely a vehicle to coax an [LNDR] from the 
employer”); Katz, Reclaiming, supra note 258, at 135 n.91 (describing the prima 
facie case as merely “a trigger for forcing an at-will employer to proffer a reason for 
its action”).
329. See Katz, Reclaiming, supra note 258, at 124-25 (explaining that the 
prima facie case “provid[es] the victims of discrimination with a target,” which 
“allows the victim to shoot at this target, to attempt to attack the employer’s 
explanation”). Others describe the purpose of Title VII’s prima facie case as 
eliminating the most common nondiscriminatory reasons for an adverse employment 
action—i.e., lack of qualification or lack of an available position—which creates an 
inference of a discriminatory motive. See, e.g., Hayes, supra note 266, at 377; Tex. 
Dep’t of Cmty. Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 253-54 (1981). The strength of 
that rationale rests upon the validity of the underlying assumption that 
discrimination is more likely than not the cause of an adverse employment action 
when those common legitimate reasons are eliminated. Compare Burdine, 450 U.S. 
at 254 (“[T]he prima facie case raises an inference of discrimination . . . because we 
presume these acts, if otherwise unexplained, are more likely than not based on the 
consideration of impermissible factors.”), and Deborah A. Calloway, St. Mary’s 
Honor Center v. Hicks: Questioning the Basic Assumption, 26 CONN. L. REV. 997, 
997-98, 1025-36 (1994) (defending the McDonnell Douglas assumption that, 
“absent explanation, adverse treatment of statutorily protected groups is more likely 
than not the result of discrimination”), with Malamud, supra note 257, at 2254-62
(arguing that the McDonnell Douglas assumption lacks empirical support).  
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Scholars have roundly criticized courts that have occasionally 
made this error in Title VII cases. Professor Michael Hayes has used 
the term “pernicious pop-up” to describe such cases in which a court 
inappropriately dismisses a case for failure to prove an element of 
the prima facie case that the employer did not raise as an LNDR—
i.e., cases in which an element of the prima facie case is allowed to 
“pop-up” as a hurdle for an employee even after the employer has 
proffered an LNDR, which should render the prima facie case 
irrelevant.330 “[W]hen an element of the prima facie case has not 
been identified by the employer as one of the true reasons for its 
action,” explains Hayes, “then there is no basis for finding that 
element to have any connection with the employer’s motivation.”331
Accordingly, Hayes and others have denounced cases in which 
courts have erred by dismissing a Title VII claim based on an 
insufficient showing of qualifications to meet the prima facie case, 
“even when the employer never claimed insufficient qualifications as
the reason for its decision.”332 When this error periodically shows up 
in Title VII cases, scholars agree that the prima facie case 
inappropriately “operates as an artificial obstacle the plaintiff must 
overcome” and “imposes an arbitrary condition the plaintiff must 
satisfy,” which is inconsistent with Title VII’s proof structure for 
assessing discrimination claims.333
Yet despite widespread agreement that such an approach is 
erroneous under Title VII—where it has become the maligned 
exception rather than the accepted norm—scholars have not 
                                                     
330. See Hayes, supra note 266, at 343, 375-76.
331. Id. at 376 (emphasis added).
332. Id.; see Davis, supra note 257, at 707-08, 751, 753, 756 (arguing that if 
a Title VII plaintiff “proves that discrimination motivated the employer’s decision to 
reject, demote or fire,” the case should not be dismissed on prima facie case grounds 
because an “unqualified” plaintiff may still suffer actionable discrimination); 
Sperino, supra note 256, at 94-95 (arguing that “when the employer’s reasons for an 
employment decision do not relate to the employee’s qualifications,” the employee’s 
qualifications should be irrelevant to a Title VII prima facie case). 
333. Hayes, supra note 266, at 376; see Davis, supra note 257, at 753, 756 
(arguing that strict application of the qualification element of a Title VII prima facie
case “doom[s] otherwise valid discrimination claims,” such as “where a defendant 
summarily rejects an unqualified applicant for an illegal discriminatory reason”); 
Ann C. McGinley, Credulous Courts and the Tortured Trilogy: The Improper Use of 
Summary Judgment in Title VII and ADEA Cases, 34 B.C. L. REV. 203, 230-31, 230 
n.125 (1993) (criticizing old Title VII cases in which courts required plaintiffs to 
prove more than objective minimum qualifications because courts were collapsing 
pretext into the prima facie stage and forcing the plaintiff to rebut the employer’s 
defense to avoid dismissal). 
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recognized that the “essential functions” component of the ADA’s 
qualification requirement can play the same pernicious pop-up role. 
When a court requires an employee to prove the ability to perform all 
job functions that the employer deems essential to state a prima facie
ADA “regarded as” case, even when the employer has asserted a 
different LNDR for its adverse employment action, the prima facie
case is not serving as a triggering mechanism to focus the case on 
facts relevant to the employer’s motive. The prima facie case is 
instead acting as a gatekeeper to legal protection against impairment-
based discrimination. In these cases, the essential functions 
component of the qualifications element effectively determines 
which employees are and are not worthy of the law’s protection from 
impairment-based employment decision-making.  
While some may argue that such a gate-keeping role is 
defensible in ADA claims under the “actual” or “record of” prongs in 
which the employee is asking for an accommodation, its application 
to the “regarded as” prong serves only to undermine the universal 
antidiscrimination protection that Congress intended with the 
ADAAA. The “essential functions” component of the qualifications 
element is being used to indirectly police the boundary of the ADA’s 
protected class, just as courts did directly in pre-ADAAA cases by 
narrowly defining the class of individuals with disabilities. This 
disqualification approach, while more subtle, still reflects the 
entrenched view that the ADA is not a civil rights law but is instead 
a welfare statute that provides special benefits to a minority group.334
Its effect is to embed disability-based stereotypes into ADA doctrine 
itself by reinforcing the assumption that impairments do affect 
performance unless the employee proves otherwise, rather than the 
other way around as Title VII doctrine presumes with other protected 
statuses.335
                                                     
334. Cf. Anderson, supra note 8, at 71 (“Courts have been slow to embrace 
disability as a matter of civil rights, instead taking more of a welfare-benefits 
approach to interpreting the rights granted under the Act.”); Matthew Diller, Judicial 
Backlash, the ADA, and the Civil Rights Model, 21 BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 19, 
23 (2000) (arguing that pre-ADAAA case law reveals that “courts do not fully grasp, 
let alone accept, the [ADA’s] reliance on a civil rights model”); Cox, supra note 
249, at 189, 193 (arguing that pre-ADAAA courts viewed the law “through the lens 
of welfare reform” rather than “the lens of civil rights”).
335. Cf. Sperino, supra note 256, at 94-95 (arguing that if courts consider a 
Title VII plaintiff’s qualifications after an employer proffers a non-qualifications-
related LNDR, the prima facie case would “sidetrack[] courts into thinking about 
whether the plaintiff is a ‘bad’ employee . . . instead of whether discrimination 
occurred”).
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Although this analysis has focused on circumstantial evidence 
cases using a burden-shifting framework, the same embedded 
stereotypes also exist in ADA cases that courts characterize as direct 
evidence or mixed-motive cases. Regardless of the framework that a 
court invokes to analyze an ADA claim at a motion stage—which is 
done inconsistently in different jurisdictions336—the “qualified 
individual” requirement is treated as an enduring threshold 
requirement that precedes inquiry into the employer’s motivations. 
As the Sixth Circuit stated in a recent ADA case, “[u]nder either a 
circumstantial-evidence analysis (requiring application of the 
McDonnell Douglas burden-shifting framework) or a direct-evidence 
analysis (not requiring the burden-shifting framework), a plaintiff 
must show that he is otherwise qualified for the position.”337 As a 
result, courts often avoid deciding contested issues about which 
framework applies by dismissing the case on a threshold conclusion 
that the employee failed to show the ability to perform all essential 
job functions.338 Plaintiffs can therefore find their ADA “regarded as”
cases derailed at the prima facie stage even when there is direct 
evidence of an impairment-based motive for an adverse employment 
action, which often occurs because the employer expressly stated 
that it refused to hire, fired, or did not promote the individual 
because of a real or perceived impairment.339
In a Title VII case involving direct evidence of a status-based 
motive, an employer is not barred from raising qualifications issues 
that are not causally related to the adverse employment decision, but 
the employer must do so as an affirmative defense alleging that it 
would have made the same decision anyway based on non-
                                                     
336. See supra note 255 and accompanying text. 
337. Wurzel v. Whirlpool Corp., No. 10-3629, 482 F. App’x 1, 10 n.10 
(6th Cir. 2012); see Mashek v. Soo Line R.R. Co, No. 11-487(MJD/JJG), 2012 WL 
6552795, at *5-6 (D. Minn. Dec. 14, 2012) (stating that “[w]hether or not the 
McDonnell Douglas burden shifting analysis applies,” an ADA plaintiff must prove 
she “is qualified to perform the essential functions of [the] job, with or without 
reasonable accommodation”).
338. See, e.g., Wurzel, 482 F. App’x at 10 n.10 (“Because th[e] case turns on 
the issue of [the employee’s] qualifications, the question whether [the employee] has 
raised a direct-evidence argument or a circumstantial-evidence argument is not 
outcome determinative.”).
339. See, e.g., Cleveland v. Mueller Copper Tube Co., No. 1:10CV307-SA-
SAA, 2012 WL 1192125, at *4-7 (N.D. Miss. Apr. 10, 2012) (requiring employee to 
prove she could perform all essential job functions to state a prima facie ADA 
“regarded as” case, even though “direct evidence” of impairment-based 
discrimination existed, and dismissing the case on the qualifications element). 
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discriminatory grounds.340 Such a defense, however, only limits the 
remedies that a Title VII plaintiff may receive and does not negate 
the employer’s liability for engaging in a discriminatory employment 
action.341 In an ADA case, in contrast, qualifications issues that are 
not causally related to the adverse employment decision may be 
raised by an employer to obtain dismissal on the ground that the 
employee failed to meet the “qualified individual” requirement, 
which precludes a finding of liability. Once again, the qualifications 
requirement ends up playing a very different role in ADA claims 
than it does in claims under Title VII. While invoking a 
disqualification strategy to defend a status-based decision affects the 
scope of the remedy when race, sex, or other protected statuses under 
Title VII are involved, the disqualification strategy serves as a 
gatekeeper to legal protection under the ADA.  
In order to resist these effects that the new disqualification 
strategy is having on the “regarded as” prong, disability advocates 
will need to do more than just seek out and bring to courts’ attention 
the few cases that properly have embraced the EEOC’s multi-factor, 
fact-specific inquiry of essential job functions. Getting courts to 
replace reflexive employer deference with meaningful job 
assessment will be a start and will help broaden access to workplace 
accommodations as Congress intended under the ADAAA’s “actual” 
disability prong. But for the ADAAA to achieve its goal of universal 
impairment-based antidiscrimination under the “regarded as” prong, 
attorneys must begin convincing courts to treat the “regarded as” 
prong more like Title VII discrimination claims and less like ADA 
claims for accommodation. Because virtually all members of the 
workforce do or will have some type of impairment during their 
workings lives, this is an outcome for which we all have a shared 
interest.  
CONCLUSION
Although this Article reveals a significant risk that might once 
again undermine the ADA’s full potential, it does not bring solely 
bad news for disability rights. Through the ADAAA, Congress has 
successfully overridden federal courts’ narrow interpretation of 
                                                     
340. See Davis, supra note 257, at 707-08, 751, 761 (arguing that lack of 
qualifications does not negate Title VII liability if the plaintiff “proves that 
discrimination motivated the employer’s decision to reject, demote or fire him,” but 
the lack of qualifications may support a “same decision anyway” defense).
341. See McKennon v. Nashville Banner Publ’g Co., 513 U.S. 352 (1995). 
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disability, which is no longer being used to routinely remove 
individuals from ADA protection. By shifting focus away from 
policing the boundaries of protected class status, the ADAAA has 
laid the foundation for universalizing and destigmatizing disability. 
By largely eliminating disability status as a gatekeeper for ADA 
protection, Congress has moved courts a step closer to confronting 
the real issues underlying impairment-based discrimination and 
exclusionary workplace design.  
To realize the ADAAA’s full potential, however, disability 
rights advocates must proactively confront the ADA’s qualifications 
requirement and the essential functions inquiry. By getting courts to 
distinguish job functions from qualification standards, organizational 
norms, and subjective expectations, and by pushing courts to engage 
in a meaningful fact-specific inquiry on the essential nature of job 
tasks, advocates may help ensure the broad access to workplace 
accommodations that Congress intended. Without such efforts, 
employers’ new disqualification strategy could enable courts to 
simply deflect disability-based stereotypes and assumptions away 
from individuals with disabilities and onto workplaces that are built 
upon unscrutinized able-bodied norms. The risk that the 
disqualification strategy poses to Congress’s goal of providing 
universal impairment-based antidiscrimination protection is even 
higher, as the “essential functions” inquiry has marked impairment 
as a second-class protected class status. By pressing courts to fully 
implement Congress’s intent to align the ADA’s “regarded as” prong 
with Title VII doctrine, advocates may help ensure that the ADA 
retains its stature as a core piece of civil rights legislation. 
